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Present First Amendment doctrine presumptively protects anything 
within the descriptive category “expression” from government 
regulation, subject to balancing against countervailing government 
interests.  As government actions during the present “war on terrorism” 
have made all too clear, that doctrine allows intolerable suppression of 
political debate and dissent – the expressive activity most integral to our 
constitutional design.  At the same time, present doctrine fails to give a 
clear account of why the Constitution protects expressive autonomy and 
when that protection properly should yield to government interests, 
leading to an inconsistent and unsatisfying free speech regime.  In this 
article, Professor Magarian advocates a bifurcation of free speech 
doctrine: protect only political speech under the First Amendment, 
subject to no countervailing interest but the interest in sustaining 
political discourse itself; meanwhile, protect nonpolitical speech as a 
matter of substantive due process.  This substantive due process proposal 
draws on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 
whose two principal contributions to the doctrine – firmly grounding due 
process protection in the value of personal autonomy and discrediting 
purely moral government regulations – provide a reliable basis for 
protecting nonpolitical speech alongside other behavior whose primary 
value lies in fostering personal autonomy.  Shielding nonpolitical speech 
under the Due Process Clause rather than the First Amendment would 
allow courts to deepen the First Amendment’s protection of political 
speech while providing a more coherent and consistent rationale for 
protecting nonpolitical speech.
1 Professor of Law, Villanova University.  Thanks to Michelle Anderson, Les Book, 
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INTRODUCTION
3As the present war in Iraq and the campaign against international 
terrorism have dragged on, the federal and state governments as well as 
nongovernmental institutions have grown increasingly bold in their 
efforts to suppress political debate and dissent in the United States.  Law 
enforcement officers infiltrate and bully peaceful dissident groups; police 
crack down brutally on mass demonstrations; cities confine protesters at 
major political events to ironically designated “free speech zones.”2
These abuses buttress a contention, familiar from the work of several 
prominent First Amendment theorists, that the Supreme Court can afford
political debate and dissent sufficient constitutional protection only by 
aiming First Amendment jurisprudence exclusively at protecting political 
speech: expression whose primary value lies in its contribution to 
political discourse.3 Narrowing the First Amendment’s scope to 
encompass only political speech would allow the Court to deepen the 
force of First Amendment protection, properly acknowledging the unique 
importance of political speech for the health of our democratic system.
The democracy-focused approach to expressive freedom, however, 
has long struggled against the far more influential idea that the Free 
Speech Clause exists to guarantee individual autonomy.4  On this view, 
all speech deserves the same degree of constitutional protection, because 
all speech entails the same exercise of autonomous will.  Accordingly, 
present First Amendment doctrine privileges breadth over depth of 
constitutional protection, giving all behavior that fits the descriptive 
category “speech” the same presumption of protection against 
government regulation but balancing all expressive interests against 
countervailing regulatory interests.5  The Court’s substantial embrace of 
autonomy as the basis for First Amendment doctrine reflects the 
widespread appeal of autonomy-based conceptions of individual rights.  
The choice of autonomy over democracy as the dominant First 
Amendment value also reflects the cost a democracy-focused approach to 
the First Amendment could exact in suppression of nonpolitical speech.  
Deepening protection for political speech by narrowing the First 
Amendment’s scope would compromise protection of nonpolitical 
expression, including much art, sexually explicit speech, and commercial 
advertising.  The problem with the autonomy-focused approach to 
expressive freedom is that it dilutes the First Amendment’s protection of
political speech by allowing even trivial government interests to trump 
2 For a discussion of these and related tactics, see infra notes 31-87 and 
accompanying text.
3 For a discussion of this democracy-focused approach to the First Amendment, see 
infra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.  For further discussion about defining the 
category of political speech, see infra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
4 For a discussion of this autonomy-focused approach to the First Amendment, see 
infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
5 For further discussion of undifferentiated balancing of interests as a central
element in present First Amendment doctrine, see infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
4the expressive interest in advancing political debate.  In addition, present 
First Amendment doctrine, by treating expressive freedom as a negative 
right rather than a substantive value, fails to establish why autonomy 
matters in speech controversies and when autonomy values should yield 
to government regulatory interests.
An ideal regime of expressive freedom would protect political debate 
with the depth of the democracy-focused First Amendment paradigm 
while simultaneously casting a broad enough net to safeguard speech that 
advances autonomy rather than democracy.  The Supreme Court recently 
opened a path toward such an ideal regime – a path that would expand 
constitutional speech protection beyond the First Amendment, into a
distinct source of constitutional rights.  In 2003, the Court held in the 
landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas6 that state bans on “sodomy” violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process guarantee.  
Lawrence has potential importance for speech protection because of the 
decision’s two boldest elements: its emphatic identification of substantive 
due process with the normative value of personal autonomy and its 
prohibition of state regulations that rest purely on moral disapproval of 
behavior.  By establishing that the Due Process Clause safeguards 
behavior integral to personal autonomy, the Court created an alternative 
repository for the idea that nonpolitical speech essential to personal 
autonomy deserves constitutional protection.7  By interposing the Due 
Process Clause against moral regulations, the Court replicated in the 
substantive due process setting the First Amendment’s antipathy toward
official attacks on socially undesirable ideas.8  Substantive due process 
doctrine after Lawrence allows for appropriate balancing of expressive 
autonomy interests against government interests in preventing tangible 
harms. 
This article proposes that the Court fulfill the speech-protective 
potential of Lawrence by transplanting the Constitution’s protection for 
nonpolitical speech – speech that primarily serves the interest in personal 
autonomy as distinct from the interest in democratic debate – from the 
First Amendment to the Due Process Clause.  Invoking substantive due 
process to protect nonpolitical speech creates an unprecedented 
opportunity to deepen the First Amendment’s protection of political 
speech while improving over present First Amendment doctrine in 
effectuating the broad consensus for protecting speech that primarily 
serves personal autonomy.  The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause 
would assume a coherent focus based on the importance of political 
debate for a healthy democratic system.  At the same time, the 
Constitution would protect nonpolitical expression based not on the arid 
premise that such expression is formally “speech” but on the crucial 
6 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
7 See infra notes 163-186 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 187-209 and accompanying text.
5understanding that nonpolitical expression, to the extent it advances 
personal autonomy, benefits society as surely as political expression does, 
although in a materially different way.
The article proceeds in three parts.  The first part establishes both the 
wisdom and the difficulty of focusing First Amendment doctrine on 
political speech.  It reprises the theoretical case for a democracy-focused 
First Amendment and substantiates that case by describing the 
government’s campaign against political dissent since the 2001 terrorist 
attacks.  It then discusses the cost for nonpolitical expression of a First 
Amendment limited to protecting political speech.  Finally, it describes 
and criticizes First Amendment theorists’ prior attempts to minimize that
cost.  The article’s second part examines Lawrence v. Texas in the context 
of the Court’s previous substantive due process jurisprudence and 
explains how the Lawrence Court’s innovations facilitate shifting 
constitutional protection of nonpolitical speech from the First 
Amendment to the Due Process Clause.  The final part examines what 
difference a shift to due process protection would make for constitutional 
doctrine in three important, controversial areas of substantially 
nonpolitical speech: artistic and cultural expression, pornography, and 
commercial advertising.  Shielding nonpolitical expression behind the 
Due Process Clause rather than the First Amendment would expand some 
aspects of constitutional speech protection beyond their present scope 
while diminishing others, and the shift would strengthen the theoretical 
bases for constitutionally shielding both political and nonpolitical speech.
I. THE PUBLIC RIGHTS THEORY OF EXPRESSIVE FREEDOM 
AND THE PROBLEM OF NONPOLITICAL SPEECH
A. Why Limit the First Amendment to Protecting Only Political 
Speech?
1. Private Rights vs. Public Rights in Free Speech Theory
The dominant influence on the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence over the past three decades has been the private rights 
theory of expressive freedom.9  The private rights theory treats the First 
Amendment as a guarantor of individual autonomy.10  That emphasis on 
autonomy generates a formal vision of expressive freedom.11  A 
regulation or action raises a First Amendment concern whenever the 
government abridges expressive opportunities that individuals or entities 
9 For a detailed portrayal of the private rights theory, see Gregory P. Magarian, 
Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1939, 1947-59 (2003) (hereinafter Magarian, Public Rights).
10 For further discussion of the idea of autonomy that animates the private rights 
theory, see infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
11 See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 9, at 1954-56.
6secure in the private marketplace.12 Although present free speech
doctrine rests on a concern with personal autonomy, the doctrine says 
little about what autonomy is or why autonomy matters; rather, it simply 
presumes that speaking reflects an important exercise of autonomous will.  
The private rights theory requires negative protection against government 
action rather than identifying any affirmative purpose of expressive 
freedom.  Accordingly, it extends First Amendment protection to all 
expression without regard to category.  Because such broad protection 
threatens to limit a wide range of government authority, the private rights 
theory employs a balancing methodology, manifest in the Supreme 
Court’s familiar framework of tiered means-ends scrutiny, which allows 
many government restrictions on speech to survive First Amendment 
review.13
The Supreme Court frequently mouths the platitude that political 
expression has special significance under the First Amendment.14  Its 
decisions, however, have paved the way for the present governmental 
assault on political dissent15 by demonstrating how the private rights 
theory’s balancing methodology serves to validate restrictions on political 
speech.  Most such decisions have turned on the Court’s subjecting 
speech restrictions deemed content-neutral and restrictions that apply to 
speech on ordinary government property to more lenient judicial review 
than it imposes on content-based regulations of speech on private 
property or in “public forums.”  Illustrative is Clark v. Community for 
Creative Nonviolence,16 in which advocates for increased government 
attention to the problem of homelessness sought to dramatize their agenda 
by sleeping in tents erected in Lafayette Square Park, in view of the 
White House.  The Court, ignoring the distinctive impact of this form of 
political advocacy, allowed the government to suppress it under a 
regulation that restricted sleeping in national parks.17  The private rights 
12 See id. at 1957-58.
13 See id. at 1958-59.
14 Recent examples include Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (emphasizing 
need for First Amendment protection of cross burning that constitutes “core political 
speech”); Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002) (claiming that “speech about 
the qualifications of candidates for public office” is “a category of speech that is ‘at the core 
of our First Amendment freedoms’”) (quoting Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861, 
863 (8th Cir. 2001)); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000) (echoing 
statement in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S 1, 16 (1976), that “the constitutional [First 
Amendment] guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct 
of campaigns for political office”); Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 
182, 186 (1999) (characterizing First Amendment protection as at its “zenith” for “core 
political speech”).
15 For a detailed discussion of recent government suppression of political debate, some 
of it sanctioned by federal courts, see infra notes 31-87 and accompanying text.
16 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
17 See id. at 293-99.  For a similar ruling in a different setting, see Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (upholding restriction on 
political groups’ access to public employee charity campaign on ground that campaign was 
government property and “nonpublic forum”).
7theory has allowed the Court to uphold restrictions on political expression 
in other cases by deeming a speaker’s invocation of regulatory mandates 
to allow expression, and not a government-facilitated decision to restrict 
speech, as the “public” action subject to constitutional sanction.  In CBS 
v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,18 for example, the Court rejected antiwar 
advertisers’ First Amendment challenge to the major broadcast networks’ 
refusal to sell them advertising time.  A plurality dismissed out of hand 
the idea that the networks’ public licenses imbued them with quasi-
governmental authority and thus First Amendment obligations.19
A series of First Amendment theorists beginning with Alexander 
Meiklejohn20 has developed the public rights theory of expressive 
freedom,21 an alternative vision of the Free Speech Clause that contrasts 
sharply with the private rights theory.  The public rights theory views the 
free speech guarantee of the First Amendment not as a negative 
protection against government interference with personal autonomy but 
rather as a Madisonian means to the end of democratic government.22
Under the public rights theory, the central purpose of the Free Speech 
Clause is to ensure that members of the political community receive the 
information they need to make informed decisions about matters of public 
policy.23 That purpose is both narrow and critically important. 
Accordingly, the public rights theory rejects the balancing methodology 
of the private rights theory in favor of a categorical approach that would 
give the First Amendment virtually absolute force against threats to 
political discourse.24  The practical consequence of the public rights 
theory is that the government may restrict access to political expression –
in Meiklejohn’s phrase, “the consideration of matters of public interest”25
– only where necessary to safeguard political debate itself.26 Writing in 
18 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
19 See id. at 121 (“Application of [First Amendment] standards to broadcast licensees 
would be antithetical to the very idea of vigorous, challenging debate on issues of public 
interest.”).
20 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF THE PEOPLE (1965).
21 For a detailed portrayal of the public rights theory, see Magarian, Public Rights, 
supra note 9, at 1972-90.  The most important contributors to the public rights tradition 
after Meiklejohn are Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein.  See Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987) (hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?); Owen Fiss, Free Speech and 
Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 255 (1992). 
22 See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 9, at 1983-84.  Vicki Jackson has recently 
pointed out that a politically focused theory of expressive freedom draws support from the 
ascent, after the First Amendment’s enactment, of equal citizenship and popular election of 
representatives as central features in our constitutional order.  See Vicki C. Jackson, 
Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 265, 295 & n.119 (2003).
23 See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 9, at 1983-85.
24 See id. at 1987-88.
25 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 79.
26 See id. at 48-49.  Meiklejohn drew this idea from Justice Brandeis’ concurrence in 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), from which he approvingly quoted the 
8the late 1940s and early 1950s, he saw pressing national challenges that 
made pluralistic, participatory democracy critically important, even as 
governmental and societal pressures strangled the political dissent 
necessary for democratic engagement.27  Treating political speech as the 
central object of expressive freedom ensures that the First Amendment 
will not fail in its essential purpose of fostering and facilitating self-
government.
Focusing the First Amendment on political speech, however, requires 
a critical tradeoff.  If the First Amendment is to provide virtually absolute 
protection for political discourse, then courts must categorically 
distinguish political from nonpolitical speech.  For Meiklejohn, 
nonpolitical expression – art, entertainment, scientific inquiry – is 
“private speech,” outside the logical boundaries of First Amendment 
protection.28  Like a sailor who throws excess weight off a sinking ship, 
Meiklejohn calls for sacrificing what he considers less essential 
categories of speech in order to ensure thorough protection of the one 
category – political speech – most integral to the nation’s democratic 
fortunes.  Only a tradeoff of broad protection, which encompasses a wide 
range of speech but subjects it to judicial balancing against countervailing 
regulatory priorities, for deep protection, limited to political speech but 
virtually absolute in its resistance to suppression, will lead to a First 
Amendment regime sufficient to protect vigorous political debate and 
dissent.
No less distinguished a pair of strange bedfellows than Robert Bork 
and Cass Sunstein has elaborated the case for limiting the First 
Amendment’s scope to encompass only political speech, although their 
arguments follow widely divergent courses of reasoning.  According to 
Bork, courts must focus the First Amendment on political expression in 
order to avoid the judicial activism that protecting any less 
constitutionally grounded categories of expression would entail.29  For 
Sunstein, reserving the First Amendment’s core for political speech 
would both effectuate the Constitution’s central purpose of fostering 
public deliberation and leave speech that hinders the development of 
proposition that “no danger flowing from speech can be judged clear and present, unless the 
incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is 
opportunity for full discussion.”  Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
27 For a detailed account of Meiklejohn’s intellectual process in developing his First 
Amendment theory, with particular attention to the influence of anticommunism run amok, 
see ADAM R. NELSON, EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE MEANING OF ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN 1872-1964, at 263-295 (2001).
28 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 79-80 (discussing private speech generally); id.
at 83-84 (characterizing scholarly pursuits, particularly in the sciences, as partially 
private); id. at 86-66 (criticizing commercial radio as reflecting private rather than public 
interests).
29 See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 20 (1971).  Even as Bork advocates the centrality of political expression, he departs 
significantly from the public rights theory by endorsing criminalization of speech that 
advocates forcible overthrow of the government.  See id.
9popular sovereignty open to certain kinds of regulation.30  Although Bork 
and Sunstein make forceful arguments for elevating political speech to 
First Amendment primacy, neither put a dent in the Court’s commitment 
to the private rights theory.  One reason for their lack of influence is their 
inability to match the historical urgency of Meiklejohn’s McCarthy-era 
plea for political openness:  Bork’s article appeared in 1971, during a 
golden age of judicial support for political dissent,31 while Sunstein wrote
in 1992, amid an era of relative national calm.
2. The Current Surge in Suppression of Political Speech
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, set events into motion 
that have revived with a vengeance the historical urgency of the public 
rights theory’s call to circle the First Amendment’s wagons around 
political speech.  Our government’s war on terrorism has fostered a 
climate of hostility toward political dissent in the United States unseen 
since Meiklejohn’s time.  Elsewhere I have documented the recent 
increase in nongovernmental institutions’ suppression of political debate 
and dissent.32  In the more traditional zone of First Amendment concern, 
federal and state law enforcement officials since 2001 have dramatically 
increased their efforts to intimidate, marginalize, and silence political 
dissenters.  These efforts have chilled dissent and exerted enormous 
pressure toward political conformity. A spokesman for the California 
Anti-Terrorism Information Center exemplifies the present atmosphere: 
“If you have a protest group protesting a war where the cause that’s being 
fought against is international terrorism, you might have terrorism at that 
protest. You can almost argue that a protest against that is a terrorist 
act.”33 In the few instances when federal courts have entertained First 
Amendment challenges to the government’s recent attacks on political 
dissent, they have employed the balancing methodology of the private 
rights theory to justify those attacks. Most muffled dissenters have never 
even gone to court, many certainly because of the costs of litigation but 
others, no doubt, because they have concluded from the shape of present 
free speech doctrine that a court would only validate government 
censorship.
The new wave of official aggression against political protestors first 
stirred in November 1999, when Seattle police greeted protestors against 
30 See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 305.
31 That year brought the most profound and farthest reaching majority opinion the 
Supreme Court has ever delivered about the value of speech generally and political dissent 
in particular.  See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
32 See Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and 
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 G.W.U. L. REV. 101, 115-27 
(2004) (hereinafter Magarian, Wartime Debate).
33 Michelle Goldberg, Outlawing Dissent, Salon.com (Feb. 11, 2004), at
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/02/11/cointelpro/print.html (last visited Oct. 12, 
2004) (quoting Mike Van Winkle).
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a World Trade Organization meeting with pepper spray, concussion 
grenades, and rubber bullets, and the mayor created a “no protest zone” 
around the Seattle Convention Center.34  In the wake of the Seattle 
debacle, cities that host high-profile public events have routinely invoked 
law enforcement necessity to restrict protestors within distant, cramped 
ghettoes – dubbed, in an Orwellian flourish that swallows irony like a 
black hole, “free speech zones.”  This tactic, which absurdly overreaches
legitimate security needs, prevents dissenting voices from challenging the 
potent propaganda of major public spectacles and expanding public 
debate about important issues.  During the 2000 Democratic National 
Convention, for example, the Los Angeles Police Department established 
a security perimeter around the Staples Center that kept protestors 260 
yards away from convention delegates.  In that case, however, a federal 
judge ruled the perimeter unconstitutional, finding its size and around-
the-clock enforcement not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest 
in public safety.35  That decision reflects what we usually assume to be 
the axiomatic First Amendment protection of political protest.36
Unfortunately, the September 11th attacks eroded courts’ resolve 
against antiprotest measures.   In July 2004, two protest groups requested 
a preliminary injunction to prevent the City of Boston from designating a 
300-foot by 90-foot space under abandoned subway tracks as the “free 
speech zone” for the 2004 Democratic National Convention.37  The zone 
was “surrounded by two rows of concrete barriers,” each topped with an 
eight-foot high chain link fence covered in tightly woven mesh fabric.  
Looser mesh netting attached the top of fence to the subway tracks above, 
which were wrapped in razor wire.  A federal judge described the space 
as “a grim, mean, and oppressive space” that created an impression “of an 
internment camp” or “a holding pen where potentially dangerous persons 
are separated from others.”38  He stressed that the design of the zone “is 
an offense to the spirit of the First Amendment . . . a brutish and 
potentially unsafe place for citizens who wish to exercise their First 
Amendment rights.”39  Nonetheless, he refused to enjoin the zone, citing 
the constraints of the physical location and law enforcement’s safety 
concerns as barriers to a solution that would “vindicate plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment rights.”40  Less than a month later, another federal judge 
34 See Patrick F. Gillham & Gary T. Marx, Complexity and Irony in Policing and 
Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle, 27 SOC. JUST. 212, 217 (2000).
35 See Service Employee Int’l Union et. al v. City of Los Angeles et. al, 114 F. Supp. 2d 
966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that designated security zone unconstitutionally 
infringed protestors’ First Amendment rights). 
36 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (invoking First Amendment to overturn 
conviction of antidraft protestor for wearing “Fuck the Draft” t-shirt in courthouse).
37 See Coalition to Protest the Democratic Nat’l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. 
Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004), aff’d, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
38 Id. at 67, 74-75.
39 Id. at 76.
40 Id.
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sustained the New York City Parks Department’s decision to deny the 
National Council of Arab Americans a permit to protest on the Great 
Lawn during the 2004 Republican National Convention.41  Although the 
court acknowledged the site’s symbolic value for the protestors, it held 
that the government’s interest in maintaining the park outweighed their 
interest in symbolic expression.42
When protestors have ventured outside their cages, they have learned 
firsthand about the power of law enforcement.  In October 2003, federal 
agents arrested a retired steelworker and his sister after they refused to 
move their anti-Bush sign to a designated “free speech area” at a 
campaign rally in Pittsburgh.43  Based on this and numerous similar 
incidents, the ACLU filed suit against the Secret Service, contending that 
segregating protestors violated their constitutional rights.44  Although the 
Secret Service pledged to discontinue segregating protestors,45 the 
practice continues.  When President Bush appeared at the West Virginia 
Capitol for a July 4, 2004 campaign rally, police arrested a young couple 
wearing anti-Bush t-shirts and charged them with trespassing – on public 
property.46  In September 2004, a woman wearing a t-shirt stenciled 
“President Bush You Killed My Son,” to protest her son’s death in Iraq, 
shouted questions at First Lady Laura Bush during a campaign speech.  
New Jersey police arrested her for defiant trespass even though she had a 
ticket to attend the rally. 47
Government officials have also used aggressive investigation and 
questioning to intimidate people who express dissenting political views.   
In November 2001, FBI and Secret Service agents appeared at a small 
41 See Nat’l Council of Arab Americans v. City of New York, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16628 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2004) (characterizing defendants’ interest in maintaining and 
managing public park as significant government interest).
42 See id. at *11, *41 (recognizing plaintiffs’ belief that location was symbolic but 
denying plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction due to doctrine of laches and plaintiffs’ 
failure to show likelihood of success on merits). 
43 See Dave Lindorff, Keeping Dissent Invisible, Salon.com (Oct. 16, 2003) 
(documenting protestor’s arrest for disorderly conduct when he refused to display sign “The 
Bushes must love the poor – they’ve made so many of us” in segregated area behind chain 
link fence). http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2003/10/16/secret_service/print.html (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2004).
44 See id. (describing ACLU’s findings of at least 17 similar incidents in seven states 
and ACLU suit against Secret Service).
45 See Jennifer Bundy, Couple arrested for wearing anti-Bush T-shirts to W. Va. event 
sues federal officials, BOSTON GLOBE (Sep. 14, 2004) (noting Secret Service agreed to 
discontinue segregation policy), available at
http://www.boston.com/dailynews/258/nation/Couple_arrested_for_wearing_an:.shtml (last 
visited Sep. 15, 2004).
46 See id. (describing couple’s arrest for trespass at Bush appearance).
47 See Soldier’s mom interrupts Laura Bush’s speech, CNN.com (Sep. 20, 2004), at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/09/17/bush.protestor/index.html (last visited Sep. 
28, 2004).  The Secret Service is currently deciding whether the woman, Sue Niederer, 
violated a federal law banning threats to kill the president when she told an online 
magazine that “she wanted to ‘rip the president’s head off’”.  Secret Service Reviews 
Comments By Dead Soldier’s Mom, WNBC.com (Sep. 22, 2004), at
http://www.wnbc.com/print/3751305/detail.html (last visited Sep. 28, 2004).  
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Houston art museum and interrogated a curator for over an hour about a 
new exhibit called “Secret Wars,” which focused on covert government 
operations.48  In November 2003, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Iowa 
served Drake University with a subpoena demanding information about 
an on-campus anti-war demonstration sponsored by the University’s 
National Lawyers’ Guild chapter.49  The government claimed the 
subpoena was necessary for the investigation of a single trespassing 
incident on nearby National Guard property.  Only mounting public 
pressure led the U.S. Attorney to withdraw the subpoena in February 
2004.50  FBI officials have interrogated political demonstrators in advance 
of several public events, including the 2004 Democratic and Republican 
National Conventions.51  The Department of Justice has also investigated 
people associated with Internet sites the government deems subversive of 
U.S. interests.  Relying extensively upon its powers under the U.S.A. 
Patriot Act,52 the Department has charged website owners whose sites 
contain incendiary information with “provid[ing] ‘expert advice or 
assistance’” to terrorists.53  Other objects of FBI and Secret Service 
attention have included a middle-aged Californian who criticized 
President Bush’s ties to oil companies during a conversation at his gym54
and a North Carolina college freshman who displayed a poster in her 
dorm room that criticized President Bush’s record on capital punishment 
as governor of Texas.55
48 See Kris Axtman, Political Dissent Can Bring Federal Agents to the Door, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 8, 2002, at 1.
49 See Monica Davey, Subpoenas on Anti-War Protest Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
2004, at A18 (discussing subpoena issued to Drake University for participant and content 
information about NLG-sponsored antiwar forum), available at http://www.why-
war.com/news/2004/02/11/subpoena.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004). 
50 See id.
51 See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Goes Knocking for Political Troublemakers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 16, 2004, at A1 (discussing FBI interviews of “past protestors and their friends and 
family members” in six states in weeks prior to both 2004 political conventions) (hereinafter 
Lichtblau, Knocking). 
52 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 
2001).
53 Eric Lipton & Eric Lichtblau, Even Near Home, a New Front Is Opening in the 
Terror Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 23, 2004, at A12.  In 2003 the government leveled such 
charges against Sami Omar al-Hussayen, a recently emigrated PhD candidate, after he 
established websites devoted to Middle East news that cheered suicide attacks.  A federal 
judge allowed the case to reach a jury.  Despite scouring “files and files and files of 
evidence,” the jurors acquitted al-Hussayen because they could find no evidence that he was 
affiliated with a terrorist organization.  Id. (quoting juror).  Similar charges are pending 
against a British citizen, but British authorities so far have refused to extradite the 
defendant to the United States.  See id. (discussing charges pending against Babar Ahmad 
in federal district court in Connecticut).
54 See Matthew Rothschild, The New McCarthyism, PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 2002, at 18.
55 See Axtman, supra note 48.  For a discussion of other recent instances in which 
federal law enforcement officers have investigated or pressured people who displayed or 
created works that satirized the Bush Administration, see Lauren Gilbert, Mocking George: 
Political Satire as “True Threat” in the Age of Global Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 843, 
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Numerous people who have mounted peaceful protests against the 
present government have paid for their efforts in blood, liberty, or 
positions in government institutions.  In November 2001, the School of 
the Americas, a controversial operation that trains foreign nationals in 
military tactics, cracked down on an annual, nonviolent demonstration at 
Fort Bening, claiming the protest “was not appropriate during the war on 
terrorism.”56  Although the event remained nonviolent, law enforcement 
officials arrested and prosecuted dozens of protestors on trespassing 
charges.57  A year later, Miami police attacked protestors who marched in 
opposition to a Free Trade Area of the Americas meeting.58  When police 
announced over a bullhorn that the demonstration would continue only if 
it remained peaceful, a protestor responded, “Does that include police 
violence?”  The police replied with batons, tear gas, rubber bullets, 
pepper spray, and concussion grenades.59  The congressionally funded 
United States Institute of Peace forced a conflict resolution trainer to 
resign because of her public statements criticizing U.S. foreign policy.60
The University of South Florida fired a tenured professor for harshly 
criticizing Israel.61  A West Virginia high school suspended a student for 
wearing a t-shirt that said “Racism, Sexism, Homophobia, I’m So Proud 
of People in the Land of the So-Called Free,” and the West Virginia 
Supreme Court upheld the suspension.62  Officials got away with these 
actions despite the First Amendment’s ostensible protection of political 
expression by public employees63 and students.64
Infiltration and monitoring of peaceful political groups violates 
political dissenters’ First Amendment right of political association,65 and 
it also offends First Amendment principles by casting the very act of 
opposing the government as legally suspect, and – if the government 
strategically publicizes the monitoring – by chilling expression.  
847-53 (2004).
56 Father Roy Bourgeois, founder of Schools of the Americas Watch, quoted in Alisa 
Solomon, Things We Lost in the Fire, VILLAGE VOICE, September 17, 2002, at 32.
57 Solomon, supra note 56.
58 See Ben Manski, Massacre in Miami? It Was a Defeat for Protestors, CAPITAL TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 2003, at 13A. Miami police had prepared for the meeting by stockpiling riot gear, 
erecting “an 8-foot high security fence around the protest zone” and setting up a “rumor 
control” hotline to field calls about alleged protests.  Tamara Lush, Trade Talks Put Miami 
on Edge, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at 1A.
59 See Manski, supra note 58, at 13A.
60 See Rothschild, supra note 54.
61 See Solomon, supra note 56.
62 See Rothschild, supra note 54.
63 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 390 U.S. 986 (1968) (holding that First Amendment 
barred Board of Education from firing teacher for making public statements critical of 
board’s policies).
64 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that 
First Amendment barred public school from suspending students for wearing black 
armbands to protest Vietnam War).
65 Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (rejecting on First Amendment grounds 
state’s demand for civil rights group’s membership list).
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Nonetheless, government infiltration and monitoring of dissenters, so
infamous from the days of McCarthyism and COINTELPRO,66 has 
reemerged during the present campaign against terrorism.  After the 
September 11 attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft loosened 
guidelines for federal investigations, in order to ensure that “if there is a 
rally of people who are criticizing the United States and its policies and 
saying that the United States will someday perhaps be destroyed because 
of that, the FBI agent can go and listen to what’s being said.”67  In 2003, 
the FBI encouraged local law enforcement officials to monitor antiwar 
groups and political protests for signs of terrorist activity,68 and the 
federal government has poured funding into local “red squads.”69  When 
an FBI employee argued that those mandates confused protected speech 
with illegal activity, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel 
declared the activity constitutionally appropriate.70  Since then groups 
across the nation, including the Colorado Coalition Against the War in 
Iraq, the American Friends Service Committee, and Peace Fresno have 
reported undercover officers’ infiltrating their organizations.71
In an effort to publicize government assaults on political dissent, the 
ACLU and the Center for National Security Studies filed Freedom of 
Information Act requests for statistics regarding the Justice Department’s 
post-September 11th activities.  When the Department denied each 
request, the groups filed suit in federal district court; in each case, the 
court sided with the government.  One federal judge upheld the Justice 
Department’s refusal to release general statistics regarding its use of 
various surveillance and investigatory tools authorized by the Patriot Act, 
holding that the Department’s interest in protecting national security 
justified secrecy.72  Another federal judge held that the Patriot Act’s 
national security exemption protected the Department’s refusal to turn 
over statistics regarding the frequency of its requests for “tangible things 
in an ‘authorized investigation.’”73  The court cited longstanding 
deference to the Executive Branch regarding national security matters and 
asserted judicial incompetence to “second-guess the executive’s 
66 See Goldberg, supra note 33.
67 Id. (quoting Attorney General Ashcroft in 2002 interview). 
68 See Lichtblau, Knocking, supra note 51 (discussing FBI mandates to local law 
enforcement agencies regarding monitoring of political dissenters and internal complaint 
filed by employee citing concerns about mandates’ infringement of constitutional free speech 
protections).   
69 See Solomon, supra note 56.
70 See Lichtblau, Knocking, supra note 51 (quoting Department of Justice opinion as 
saying “given the limited nature of such public monitoring, any possible ‘chilling’ effect 
caused by the bulletins would be quite minimal and substantially outweighed by the public 
interest in maintaining safety and order during large-scale demonstrations”).
71 See Goldberg, supra note 33. 
72 American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Department of Justice, 265 F. 
Supp. 2d 20 (D. D.C. 2003).
73 American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Department of Justice, 321 F. 
Supp. 2d 24 (D. D.C. 2004).
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judgment” on national security.74  These decisions validated an 
unprecedented government effort to diminish the public’s access to 
information about the people’s business.75
The First Amendment is supposed to ensure that the news media can 
vigorously pursue and report news about government actions and 
proceedings.76  But the Bush administration, through control of access to 
information and occasional overt pressure, has eviscerated the news 
media’s traditional watchdog role, a process that media corporations’ 
frequent self-censorship has made shamefully easy.77   One particularly 
important instance of heightened government secrecy is a federal policy, 
issued within days of the 2001 attacks and altering decades of past 
practice, of reflexively closing deportation hearings on national security 
grounds.78   Under that policy, the Department of Justice holds unfettered 
discretion to designate any immigration proceeding a “special interest” 
matter, based on a belief that the immigrant “might have connections 
with, or possess information pertaining to, terrorist activities against the 
United States.”79  A “special interest” designation requires courts to seal 
the case file; remove the case from the docket; and bar the detainee’s 
family, visitors, and reporters from the proceedings.80  This policy has 
allowed the government to decide the fates of hundreds of immigrants 
74 Id. at 36.
75 See Eric Lichtblau, Government Shrinking Access to Information, MILWAUKEE 
JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 2001, at 28A (describing general increase in government 
secrecy in wake of September 11 attacks); On the Public’s Right To Know: The Day Ashcroft 
Censored Freedom of Information, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 6, 2002, at D4 (discussing 
memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft that “vigorously urged federal agencies 
to resist most Freedom of Information Act requests made by American citizens”).
76 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding that 
“the right [of the press and public] to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of 
the First Amendment”); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing 
to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers, leaked government documents related to 
national security).
77 See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 32, at 117-121 (documenting instances of 
misinformation and suppression of information by U.S. news media since 2001 terrorist 
attacks).  The Bush Administration’s unprecedented promotion of its policies via Potemkin 
journalists – including secret payments to opinion commentators, production and 
distribution of fake television news segments, and issuance of White House press 
credentials to an incognito conservative activist – has exacerbated the failures of real media 
outlets.  See Frank Rich, The White House Stages Its “Daily Show,” N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 
2005, at B1 (describing Bush Administration’s disinformation tactics).
78 See Directive of Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy to All Immigration 
Judges, Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001) (detailing procedures for special interest 
deportation hearings), at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2005) (hereinafter Creppy Directive).  The Creppy Directive altered a 
longstanding policy that deportation proceedings were open to the public.  See Detroit Free 
Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Since 1965 INS regulations have 
explicitly required deportation hearings to be presumptively open.”) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.27). 
79 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(quoting declaration of Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism 
and Counterintelligence at Federal Bureau of Investigation), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 
(2003). 
80 See Creppy Directive, supra note 78.
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without the accountability that open proceedings ensure.81  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has upheld the policy 
against constitutional challenge,82 although the Sixth Circuit has 
disagreed;83 meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit has upheld the government’s 
refusal even to provide a count of hearings closed under the policy.84
The threat of unaccountable deportation does not, of course, represent 
our government’s only recent assault on resident foreign nationals.  The 
First Amendment supposedly protects the expressive rights of 
noncitizens,85 and that protection should carry special importance to the 
extent citizens care about maximizing the presence of diverse viewpoints 
in domestic political debate.86  Those considerations, however, have not 
stopped the government from using the exceptional leverage it holds over 
foreign nationals in the United States to suppress their political 
association and expression.  Government actions, most prominently the 
broad and seemingly arbitrary practice of questioning and often detaining 
noncitizens for alleged associations with asserted terrorists, have 
effectively chilled immigrant communities from speaking out on political 
issues that strongly affect their interests.87
Over the past four years, the First Amendment has failed in its
essential task of protecting political dissent.  That failure provides 
powerful support for the tradeoff urged by the public rights theory of 
81 An estimated 600 detainees endured closed hearings through mid-2003.  See Heidi 
Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in 
the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 95–96 (2004) (citing figure 
provided by Solicitor General Theodore Olsen in brief opposing writ of certiorari in North 
Jersey Media Group).  Despite evidence that almost none of the people subjected to closed 
deportation hearings have terrorist connections, the Department has continued to close 
hearings.  See id. at 96 & n.8 (noting Department of Justice’s acknowledgment that most 
detainees did not have information regarding terrorist activities).  The Department has 
publicly suggested it may reconsider the Creppy Directive.  See Behind Closed Doors, INT’L 
HERALD, May 31, 2003, at 6 (quoting Department as saying that procedures for closed 
hearings might “likely be revised”).  At this time, however, the policy appears unchanged.  
82 See North Jersey Media Group, supra (holding Creppy Directive constitutional 
under Richmond Newspapers analysis).
83 See Detroit Free Press, supra (holding Creppy Directive unconstitutional under 
Richmond Newspapers analysis).
84 See Center for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. United States Department of Justice, 331 F.3d 
918, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (sustaining Department of Justice’s right to deny Freedom of 
Information Act request concerning INS detainees), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004). 
85 “Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country.”  
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945), citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) 
(overturning contempt-of-court conviction of alien labor leader that rested on telegram to 
Secretary of Labor about pending case). 
86 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 118-19 (contending “that unhindered expression 
must be open to non-citizens, to resident aliens, to writers and speakers of other nations, to 
anyone, past or present, who has something to say which may have significance for a citizen 
who is thinking of the welfare of this nation”).
87 See Solomon, supra note 56 (discussing broad powers for Attorney General to 
identify and detain noncitizens suspected of “terrorist” ties under U.S.A. Patriot Act).  Many 
Muslim Americans fear even appearing at community events.  See, e.g., id. (discussing 
decreased attendance at Brooklyn Pakistani community festival).
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expressive freedom: narrow the scope of the Free Speech Clause to cover 
only political expression, in order to deepen protection of that most 
essential category of speech by eliminating the balancing of political 
expression against government regulatory interests.  That tradeoff would 
improve upon the present state of constitutional protection for political 
debate and dissent in numerous ways.  First, the public rights theory 
would compel courts to extend political expression far greater protection 
against government regulation.  Unless the government could justify a 
restraint on political debate as needed to protect political debate itself, the 
public rights theory would entail a rigorous presumption against the 
restraint.  Second, more dissenters who faced government sanction would 
avail themselves of judicial process, because courts’ adjudications of 
First Amendment cases necessarily would send a consistent message that 
our legal system took constitutional protection of political debate 
seriously.  Third, the public rights theory’s emphasis on robust political 
debate as the necessary bottom line of First Amendment doctrine would 
justify courts in blocking even some nongovernmental constraints on 
public political debate, at least in wartime.88  Fourth, that same bottom-
line view of expressive freedom would produce a more open and dynamic 
political process that would widen the variety of viewpoints present in 
public political debate.89
Making political speech the exclusive object of First Amendment 
protection would bring impressive benefits.  The public rights theory’s 
problem, however, is that its proposed tradeoff of broadly protecting all 
speech for deeply protecting only political speech entails steep, arguably
intolerable costs in exposure of nonpolitical speech to official 
suppression.
B. Problems With Protecting Only Political Speech Under 
the First Amendment
1. Distinguishing Political Speech
Although this article concentrates on the doctrinal consequences of 
limiting the First Amendment to protection of political speech,90 the 
discussion will benefit from consideration of a logically prior problem: 
the need to distinguish political from nonpolitical speech.  Meiklejohn 
acknowledged that “[t]he human relations involved in the distinction 
between the general welfare and individual advantage are deeply and 
permanently perplexing.”91  Is art political?  Does the arguably 
transgressive character of pornography render it political?  What about 
commercial information that affects important consumer decisions?  Even 
88 I develop this contention in Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 9, at 2010-60.
89 I develop this contention in Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 32, at 150-68.
90 See infra notes 116-128 and accompanying text.
91 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 81.
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if any or all of these categories of speech are not inherently political, do 
they acquire political character whenever attempts at official censorship 
make them objects of political controversy? 92
Although we tend to experience the familiar as transparent, we should 
not make the mistake of treating the public rights theory’s definitional 
challenge as a disadvantage in comparison with present First Amendment 
doctrine.  Line-drawing problems inhere in the necessary task of 
providing a theoretical explanation for expressive freedom.93  The 
dominant private rights theory of expressive freedom,94 which rejects 
categorization of types of speech, nevertheless entails at least three 
problematic exercises in line-drawing.  First, because some concept must 
bound the First Amendment’s constraint on government authority, the 
private rights theory’s disdain for categorical distinctions requires it to 
stake a great deal on the notoriously elusive distinction between speech 
and action.95  Second, the private rights theory’s balancing methodology 
requires identifying and comparing distinct regulatory and expressive 
values.96 This balancing process impels courts both to assess the relative 
importance of different sorts of expressive conduct97 and to determine 
whether a government regulatory interest somehow outweighs a 
conceptually incommensurable expressive interest.98  Third, the private 
rights theory’s negative model of expressive rights places defining 
emphasis on a rigid distinction between the ephemeral categories of 
“public” and “private.”99  Resolving any First Amendment theory’s line-
92 Critics of the theory have repeatedly noted this problem.  Objections to Meiklejohn’s 
distinction between public and private speech immediately formed the leading attack on his 
First Amendment theory.  See NELSON, supra note 27, at 270-74 (summarizing and 
discussing early criticisms).  Leading examples include Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn’s 
Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 COLO. L. REV. 1109, 
1117 (1993) (arguing that Meiklejohn “violates th[e] necessary indeterminacy of public 
discourse” by limiting what can count as political); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free 
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 596-97 (1982) (criticizing Meiklejohn’s line-drawing); Steven 
Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of 
the First Amendment, 78 N.W.U. L. REV. 1212, 1225-39 (1983) (arguing against distinction 
between political and commercial speech). 
93 For the leading explanation of the need for some theory to ground free speech 
doctrine, see Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
YALE L.J. 877, 877-78 (1963).
94 See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (describing private rights theory).
95 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (upholding penalty 
enhancement for racial motivation of crime because enhancement targeted “bias-inspired 
conduct” rather than expression).
96 See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
97 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976) (per curiam) (concluding that 
political contributions have less expressive value than political expenditures).
98 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357-68 (1997) 
(assessing minor parties’ expressive interest in having option to choose another party’s 
nominee as its own “fusion” nominee, assessing state’s asserted political stability interests 
in banning fusion candidacies, and concluding that the latter outweighed the former).
99 See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 9, at 1956-58 (explaining private rights 
theory’s reliance on public-private distinction to vindicate negative right to expressive 
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drawing problems requires difficult judgments about whatever factors the 
theory emphasizes in defining expressive freedom. 
Theorists in the public rights tradition have tried to generate a strict 
definition of political speech.  Meiklejohn defines the proper class of 
protected expression as “speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon 
issues with which voters have to deal . . . the consideration of matters of 
public interest.”100  Sunstein “treat[s] speech as political when it is both 
intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some 
issue.”101  These attempts to define political speech share two problems.  
First, they fail to achieve any clear, satisfying delineation.  Meiklejohn’s 
“directly or indirectly,” Sunstein’s reliance on subjective intent and 
perception, and their shared emphasis on the uncertain notion of public 
affairs seem to preclude a stable understanding of which speech counts as 
“political.”  Second, even if we could arrive at a fixed, stable definition of 
“political speech,” judicial reliance on that definition might stunt growth 
over time in our understanding of what concerns should become subjects 
of collective societal deliberation and resolution.  Such a definition, for 
example, might have interfered with our society’s emerging awareness 
over the past half century of the relationship between sexual identity and 
political change.102  Thus, a stable conception of “political speech” 
appears impossible at best and undesirable at worst.
Efforts to define political speech offer promise, however, if we resist 
the allure of stability and instead consider “politics” as a dynamic 
concept.103  On this understanding, the category of “political speech” 
attains distinction not lexically but functionally.  Meiklejohn wrote much 
less about what political speech is than about what it does: it presents
“squarely and fearlessly everything that can be said in favor of 
[governing] institutions, everything that can be said against them.”104  In 
his foundational explanation of expressive freedom as a public right, 
“[t]he principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of 
the program of self-government.”105  Accordingly, a practical distinction 
of political speech transcends any single, abstract inquiry, requiring 
instead an ongoing examination that encompasses both theoretical inquiry 
and concrete adjudication.  
freedom).  For a thorough critique of the public-private distinction in the context of First 
Amendment doctrine, see Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 32, at 127-55.
100 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 79.
101 Sunstein, supra note 21, at 304.
102 See generally WALTER L. WILLIAMS & YOLANDA RETTER EDS., GAY AND LESBIAN 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (2003).
103 I have previously advocated a similar distinction in the practice of partisan politics 
in the United States.  See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 9, at 1996-2002 (setting forth 
dynamic party politics theory of political parties’ role in elections).
104 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 77.
105 Id. at 27.  Professor Fiss, another leading architect of the public rights theory, 
similarly advocates a “public debate principle” of expressive freedom, under which “[state] 
action is judged by its impact on public debate, a social state of affairs.”  Fiss, Why the 
State?, supra note 21, at 786.
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Although the Supreme Court knows how to differentiate 
constitutional speech protection based on distinctions among explicit 
categories of speech,106 it probably would implement the public rights 
theory most effectively not by attempting a rigid delineation of political 
speech but rather by examining in any given case whether a burden on 
speech undermined discourse best understood as concerning matters of 
public deliberation or, in contrast, undermined speech best understood as 
serving some individual’s interest in personal autonomy.  The Court has 
shown an understanding of how to draw exactly this sort of distinction in 
more limited First Amendment contexts.  In a defamation case, the court 
will afford a defendant’s allegedly defamatory statement heightened 
insulation from liability if the statement’s object is a “public official”107
or a “public figure.”108 The court has insulated public employees and 
publishers of sensitive information from adverse actions that targeted 
speech about matters of public concern.109   In evaluating media 
regulations, the Court has permitted broadcast content requirements based 
at least in part on the idea that broadcasters, by virtue either of their 
public licenses110 or their control over communication bottlenecks,111
106 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976) (defining “commercial speech” as a category of expression entitled to less 
than full First Amendment protection); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining 
“obscenity” as a category of unprotected speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 
(1969) (defining incitement to imminent lawless action as a category of unprotected speech); 
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (defining “true threats” as a category of 
unprotected speech); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (recognizing 
some defamation as a category of unprotected speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (defining “fighting words” as a category of unprotected speech).
107 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (emphasizing “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” in 
applying more stringent standard of proof to defamation actions brought by “public 
officials”).
108 See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967) (extending Sullivan
requirement for defamation judgments to cases brought by “public figures”).
109 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (rejecting application of wiretap 
statutes to republication of illegally obtained information because “privacy concerns give 
way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance”);  
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968) (overturning school board’s firing of 
plaintiff for speaking about “a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment of 
the school administration, including the School Board, cannot, in a society that leaves such 
questions to popular vote, be taken as conclusive”).  Eugene Volokh asserts that “it 
shouldn’t be for courts to decide what is a matter of ‘public concern’ and what isn’t,” given 
that “[m]ost such matters of taste are left to individual speakers and listeners to 
determine.”  Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts 
After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 747 (2003).  Volokh’s 
position exemplifies the logical consequences of the private rights theory’s negative, 
purposeless conception of expressive freedom.  See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
110 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969) (upholding 
federal requirement of equal broadcast time for opposing political positions based on public 
need to allocate broadcast frequencies through public licenses).
111 See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 656 (1994) (applying lesser 
standard of First Amendment scrutiny to federal “must carry” requirement for cable 
systems based on cable operators’ control over large population’s access to important source 
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perform a special public function.  All of these rules require functional 
assessments of the public importance of certain types or means of 
expression – the same sort of assessment a court would need to make if 
First Amendment jurisprudence shifted toward a focus on political 
expression.
The line between subjects of public and private concern disappears at 
some level of abstraction.112  Certainly that line’s location is a necessary 
and proper subject for continual reassessment.113  Understood 
functionally, however, political speech has both value and vulnerability 
distinct from those that attach to other categories of expression.114 Some 
legal impediments to personal autonomy reflect political power 
differentials, but many do not, and the fact that democratic participation
requires a measure of personal autonomy does not mean that all 
autonomy protections advance democratic deliberation.  The public rights 
theory distinguishes the benefits of expression for democratic debate 
from its benefits for personal autonomy in order to ensure a functional, 
robust democratic system.  The prospect of judicial determinations about 
the value of various forms of expression may appear troubling, but in this 
area as in so many others, judges cannot decide anything without 
assessing the values at stake.115  Better to embody such evaluations in 
of information).
112 Eminent constitutional thinkers have cast the Supreme Court’s commitment to 
personal autonomy in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), discussed infra notes 152-
209 and accompanying text, as a means of advancing democratic ideals.  See Jane S. 
Schacter, Lawrence v. Texas and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Democratic Aspirations, 13 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RIGHTS L. REV. 733, 734 (2004) (situating Lawrence in a line of 
Fourteenth Amendment cases concerned with “the culture and conditions of democracy”); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dares Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1899 (2004) (positing that “the commitments we make to 
our principles and to one another in the context of associations ranging from the most 
intimate to those with the polity as a whole [] constitute the essential core of 
constitutionalism”).
113 See Post, supra note 92, at 1117 (positing the “necessary indeterminacy of public 
discourse”).  My understanding of expressive freedom owes much to Post’s rich account of 
the depth to which democratic principles require public contention to extend.  See id. at 
1116 (maintaining that “public discourse must be conceptualized as an area within which 
citizens are free continuously to reconcile their differences and to (re)construct a distinctive 
and ever-changing national identity”).   My difference with Post goes to his complete trust 
in the economic marketplace as the sole conceivable mechanism for ensuring the freedom he 
extols.  See id. at 1118-19 (rejecting involvement by public institutions in achieving 
democratic aims of a Meiklejohn-derived First Amendment theory as “[m]anagerial” 
interference with “the value of autonomy”).  Post dismisses what he identifies, in a term 
that still had bite in 1993, as “collectivist” doubts about the public-private distinction and 
the autonomous character of individual decisions in our society on the circular basis that 
those doubts threaten the conception of democracy he wishes to sustain.  See id. at 1125-33.  
That dismissal ignores real threats that nongovernmental actors pose to democracy.  Far 
better to give courts a role in policing those actors than to let them police themselves. 
114 See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 32, at 105-15 (discussing distinctive 
value and vulnerability of political debate compared to other speech).
115 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-13 
(1979) (contending that judges are uniquely able to evaluate and balance competing 
constitutional values); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 697, 711 (1931) (calling for a realist theory of values and recognizing many approaches 
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forthright, evolving doctrine than to pretend they need not occur.
2. Defying the Consensus to Protect Nonpolitical Speech
The definitional problem aside, this article addresses a deeper 
problem with confining expressive freedom under the First Amendment 
to political speech: the tension that pits the imperative to privilege 
politically valuable expression against ingrained judicial practice, social 
norms, and intellectual commitments that compel undifferentiated First 
Amendment protection for most categories of speech.
The public rights theory calls for privileging political speech under 
the First Amendment because political speech has unique value for 
democracy.  People, however, tend to believe speech in general deserves 
a constitutional shield because speech in general advances personal 
autonomy.  That belief, which animates the private rights theory’s 
directive to protect expression without regard to category, comports with 
the most common conception of constitutional rights.  The impetus to
protect individuals’ autonomous behavior against government intrusion, 
subject in appropriate cases to superseding government regulatory 
interests, has deep roots in our legal tradition and exerts a powerful hold 
on our understanding.116  Autonomy strikes most people as especially 
salient for expressive freedom, because the act of speaking manifests the 
moral agency that defines an individual in relation to other people and to 
the broader community.117
The present Supreme Court has proclaimed unanimously “the 
fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker 
has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”118
Although the Court has done little to elaborate the positive value of 
expressive autonomy, numerous First Amendment theorists have built 
sophisticated accounts of expressive freedom around personal autonomy.  
Charles Fried states the essential claim: “Freedom of expression is 
properly based on autonomy: the Kantian right of each individual to be 
treated as an end in himself, an equal sovereign citizen of the kingdom of 
ends with a right to the greatest liberty compatible with the like liberties 
of all others.”119  C. Edwin Baker maintains that courts should understand 
to juristic truth).
116 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 122 n.4 (3d 
ed. 1884) (describing natural rights and the limited role of government in preserving 
liberty); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 350 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690) 
(positing that the individual is willing yield some freedom to government in order to 
preserve “the enjoyment of the property he has in [the state of nature]”).
117 See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 1014-
15 (1997) (hereinafter Baker, Harm) (substantiating common intuition that recognition of 
individuals’ moral agency is essential to formation of political community).
118 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
119 Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992) (footnote omitted).
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the First Amendment to protect all speech that represents the autonomous 
exercise of the speaker’s expressive capacity “because of the way the 
protected conduct fosters individual self-realization and self-
determination without improperly interfering with the legitimate claims 
of others.”120  Martin Redish posits that the Free Speech Clause serves 
entirely to advance the value of “individual self-realization,” which 
encompasses and supersedes the interest in a healthy democratic 
process.121
Some sorts of speech that have substantially or primarily nonpolitical 
value, notably pornography122 and commercial speech,123 defy consensus, 
leading to distinctly aberrant or incoherent lines of First Amendment 
doctrine.  But the Supreme Court has enforced a broad societal consensus 
that artistic and literary works deserve constitutional insulation from 
government interference without regard to their contribution, or lack 
thereof, to political debate.124  Similarly, the Court’s decisions reflect a 
120 C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 964, 966 (1978); see also Baker, Harm, supra note 117, at 982-87 (describing 
considerations of expressive autonomy that justify First Amendment protection of speech).  
Baker argues pointedly that the autonomy-based explanation for expressive freedom “is 
much more intertwined with our normative commitments” than the democracy-based 
explanation.  See id. at 1014-17.
121 See Redish, supra note 92, at 601-605 (explaining “individual self-realization” value 
in relation to democratic process value); see also Post, supra note 92, at 1119 
(conceptualizing autonomy as a value that dictates a sphere of expressive freedom “within 
which heterogeneous versions of collective identity can be free continuously to collide and 
reconcile”).
122 The incoherence of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on pornography begins with 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which declares a broad category of “patently 
offensive” sexually explicit speech, defined by reference to “community standards,” outside 
the protection the First Amendment is supposed to accord to speech that offends the 
community.  In subsequent decisions, the Court, for example, allowed the FCC effectively to 
ban scatological language over the radio airwaves, then struck down a congressional 
requirement that cable television providers scramble sexually explicit programming.  
Compare FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) with United States v. Playboy 
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).  This article discusses a substantive due 
process approach to regulations of pornography infra notes 268-284 and accompanying text. 
123 The Supreme Court has had difficulty even defining commercial speech.   Compare 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976) (defining commercial speech as “speech which does ‘no more than propose a 
commercial transaction,’”) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, 
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)) with Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 
557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial speech more broadly to include “expression related 
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience”).  The Court’s approach to 
commercial speech protection remains unstable and unsettled.  Compare Central Hudson, 
447 U.S. at 566 (announcing four-part intermediate scrutiny standard for commercial 
speech cases) with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality 
opinion) (maintaining that “[t]he mere fact that messages propose commercial transactions 
does not in and of itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to 
suppress them” and proposing more thorough protection for commercial speech in certain 
circumstances).  This article discusses a substantive due process approach to regulations of 
commercial speech infra notes 285-308 and accompanying text.
124 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd. 
502 U.S. 105, 115-116 (1991) (striking down state regulation that imposed financial burden 
on criminals who published books relating to their crimes as invalid under First 
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broadly shared belief that the Constitution should protect categories of 
nonpolitical speech as varied as scientific inquiry,125 frank discussions 
about sex and sexuality,126 and charitable appeals.127  Thus, the Court has 
consistently extended full First Amendment protection to those categories 
of speech.128
C. Unsatisfactory Solutions to the Nonpolitical Speech Problem
Prior advocates of the public rights theory have tried and failed to 
strike the delicate but necessary balance between preserving the theory’s 
essence and honoring the societal consensus that nonpolitical speech 
deserves constitutional protection.  These previous attempts have taken 
two principal forms: (1) expanding the category of political speech and 
(2) proposing alternative sources of constitutional protection for 
nonpolitical speech.  The first approach, although useful to some extent, 
cannot fully address the autonomy concern without undermining the 
method and purpose of the public rights theory.  Past attempts at the 
second approach have lacked force or coherence and have failed to 
address the affirmative reasons why people favor constitutional protection 
of much nonpolitical speech.  That second approach, however, points 
toward the newly viable substantive due process solution proposed in Part 
II.
1. Expanding the Category of Political Speech
When a categorical method of distributing some benefit loses support 
because it excludes popular or sympathetic beneficiaries, a 
straightforward solution is available: expand the category.  In party 
politics this is known as the “big tent” approach;129 in the public policy 
Amendment).
125 See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (including “scientific value” among safe harbors that 
bring otherwise unprotected “obscenity” within the First Amendment).
126 See, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 878 (1997) (partially 
explaining decision to invalidate broad-based restriction on Internet content on ground that 
ban might encompass “discussions about prison rape or safe sexual practices”).
127 See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988) (holding solicitation of charitable 
appeals for funds within the protection of the First Amendment); Village of Schaumberg v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding that First Amendment 
protects solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations).
128 I exclude religious expression from this list because the First Amendment specially 
protects religious expression, as well as action, through the Free Exercise Clause, at least in 
theory.  See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (effectively limiting effect 
of Free Exercise Clause to regulations that deliberately or discriminatorily burden religion).  
In fact, the Free Exercise Clause, by defining a basis for constitutional protection without 
distinguishing between speech and conduct, provides the closest thing to an existing 
constitutional model for the extension of substantive due process this article advocates.
129 See, e.g., KENNETH S. BAER, REINVENTING DEMOCRATS 120-121 (2000) (describing 
Democratic Party’s attempt to maintain an ideologically wide range of elected officials as a 
“Big Tent” approach).  For a brief account of major political parties’ tendency to moderate 
25
arena, including a vast range of middle-income beneficiaries in order to 
sell the Social Security Act in the 1930s illustrates the same principle.130
In the First Amendment context, the more speech falls within a theory’s 
privileged category of political speech, the broader the theory’s appeal.
The most important example of this approach in the public rights 
tradition is Meiklejohn’s treatment of artistic expression.  Art appears to 
lie outside the range of Meiklejohn’s First Amendment; at a minimum, 
his disdain for entertainment media suggests a refusal to attribute political 
value to artistic expression.131  However, in a later elaboration of his 
theory, Meiklejohn acknowledges that a “vast array of idea and fact, of 
science and fiction, of poetry and prose, of belief and doubt, of 
appreciation and purpose, of information and argument” legitimately 
contributes to citizens’ decisions about matters of public policy and thus 
warrants First Amendment protection.132 Struggles with the conceptual 
limits of the public rights theory’s coverage can generate important, 
constructive refinements.  Much artistic expression reflects political 
convictions and/or informs political debate, and no doubt further 
examination and debate of the boundaries between political and 
nonpolitical speech will yield comparably sound insights about the 
political essence of other nominally nonpolitical expression.133
As a strategy for making the public rights theory more palatable, 
however, expanding the category of political speech contains a fatal flaw.  
To whatever extent we broaden the class of protected speech, we 
simultaneously weaken the categorical methodology that defines the 
public rights theory.  As Meiklejohn emphasizes, the First Amendment 
“remains forever confused and unintelligible unless we draw sharply and 
clearly the line which separates the public welfare of the community from 
the private goods of any individual citizen or group of citizens.”134  If we 
really believe, and can explain persuasively, that a given type of 
expression has political character, then admitting that expression to the 
scope of First Amendment protection genuinely serves the interest in 
ensuring robust political debate.  But we cannot reasonably hope that the 
categorical boundary of political expression extends to or past the point 
necessary to allay a critical mass of concerns about the theory’s costs.  
Comprehensively reconciling the theory’s scope with autonomy values by 
expanding the category of protected expression would inevitably require 
policy positions by building broad-based coalitions, see Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 
9, at 1961-62.
130 See, e.g., DANIEL NELSON, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 205 (1969) (explaining that 
securing political approval of Social Security Act required ensuring that Act would benefit 
broad group of constituencies).
131 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing Meiklejohn’s views on 
“private” speech).  This disdain appears especially vivid in Meiklejohn’s savage attack on 
the commercial radio.  See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 86-88.
132 Id. at 117.
133 See supra notes 106-115 and accompanying text (discussing value of ongoing dispute 
about the boundaries of politics).
134 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 79-80.
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either conceptual gerrymandering or elision of any categorical boundary.  
Such compromise would fatally undermine the goal of deep protection for 
political speech, increasing pressure toward retaining a balancing 
approach that reduces political expression to the same stature as speech 
less integral to a healthy democracy.
2. Finding Alternative Constitutional Protection for 
Nonpolitical Speech
The failure of attempts to improve the public rights theory by
expanding the category of political expression demonstrates that any 
effort to cure the theory’s coverage deficit must maintain a conceptual 
distinction between political and nonpolitical speech.  The surest way to 
protect different categories of expression while keeping them separate is 
to assign different constitutional status to the respective categories.  
Leading public rights theorists, not surprisingly, have tried to do exactly 
that.  Their ingenious efforts, while ultimately unsuccessful, provide a 
template for a more effective solution.
Meiklejohn’s initial statement of the public rights theory appears to 
acknowledge the strategic risk of leaving substantial categories of speech 
unprotected.  Even as he advocates limiting the scope of First 
Amendment protection to political speech and denigrates the importance 
of what he calls “private” speech, Meiklejohn offers an olive branch.  
Nonpolitical, “private” speech, while not entitled to the ironclad 
protection of the First Amendment, should still get constitutional 
protection as an aspect of the “liberty” secured by the procedural due 
process principles of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.135  In other 
words, the government should enjoy discretion to restrict or punish 
nonpolitical speech, but not without offering notice and the possibility of 
a hearing.  This approach, Meiklejohn argues, properly treats nonpolitical 
speech like ordinary conduct, reflecting the insight that the First 
Amendment elevates political speech to a special position.136 From a 
contemporary, strategic perspective, however, Meiklejohn’s treatment of 
nonpolitical speech amounts to dooming with faint protection.  No one 
who disdains the public rights theory for its failure to protect a substantial 
amount of nonpolitical speech will warm to the theory upon assurance 
that the censor’s iron fist comes sheathed in a procedural velvet glove.
Sunstein’s version of alternative constitutional protection for 
nonpolitical speech appears, upon first glance, far more promising.  In 
one of two alternative proposals for revising free speech doctrine, he 
advocates a “two-tiered” First Amendment.137  Under this approach, the 
135 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 79-80.
136 See id. at 80.
137 See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 301-315 (developing argument for “primacy of 
politics” in First Amendment theory).  Sunstein’s alternative proposal, which he calls “a 
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First Amendment would fully protect political speech; nonpolitical 
speech would get weaker First Amendment protection that would yield 
more readily to countervailing government interests.138  Sunstein justifies 
this approach by maintaining that the Court already accords special 
protection to political speech while denying or limiting First Amendment 
protection as to several categories of nonpolitical expression: obscenity, 
commercial speech, and libel of private persons.139  Moreover, he notes, 
the Court treats numerous other instances of nonpolitical speech –
conspiracies, purely verbal workplace harassment, bribery, and threats –
as if they are not speech at all for First Amendment purposes.140  Given 
these existing doctrines, Sunstein argues, an explicit shift to a two-tiered 
First Amendment would merely ratify our active intuitions about the need 
to treat different categories of speech differently.
Although Sunstein appears to offer greater assurances to skeptics of 
the public rights theory who fear for the safety of nonpolitical speech, 
those assurances ultimately lack substance.  First, nothing in the text, 
structure, or history of the Constitution provides a basis for bifurcating 
the First Amendment.  Unlike Meiklejohn’s elaboration of the public 
rights theory, which anticipates and addresses originalist and textualist 
critiques,141 Sunstein’s two-tiered First Amendment is nothing more than 
a convenient invention.  In relying on the claim that the Court has already 
moved toward a two-tiered First Amendment, Sunstein makes the mistake 
of building a doctrine on disparate rules that he concedes lack a “clear 
principle.”142  In addition, the argument from existing practice contradicts 
Sunstein’s own normative precept for advocating change in First 
Amendment theory: that the Court is insufficiently protecting political 
speech while overprotecting less deserving categories of expression.143
Second, and accordingly, the substance of Sunstein’s two-tiered First 
Amendment derives from nothing more than his own normative priorities: 
the objection to giving such unworthies as the securities laws, 
pornography, 1-900 numbers, large political expenditures, and the 
New Deal for Speech,” emphasizes the politically determined nature of expressive 
opportunities and advocates government regulation to improve the flow of ideas.  See id. at 
263-300.  The public rights theory of expressive freedom contains elements in common with 
each of Sunstein’s approaches.  See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text (describing 
public rights theory).
138 See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 306 (arguing that “government should be under a 
special burden of justification when it seeks to control speech intended and received as a 
contribution to public deliberation”).
139 See id. at 302.
140 See id.
141 See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 9, at 1972-73 (describing textual genesis of 
Meiklejohn’s First Amendment theory in paradox of First Amendment’s absolutist language 
but necessarily limited effect).
142 Sunstein, supra note 21, at 302.
143 See id. at 258 (contrasting early First Amendment decisions that protected political 
dissenters’ rights with contemporary decisions that protect rights of various private and 
corporate interests).
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autonomy of large broadcasters First Amendment pride of place.144
Sunstein’s bifurcation of the First Amendment creates a structural facade
for his subjective preferences.
Beyond these problems, Meiklejohn’s and Sunstein’s attempts to 
relocate protection for nonpolitical speech share a final, essential flaw.  
Neither approach addresses the basic source of discomfort with the public 
rights theory: that the Constitution should protect nonpolitical speech as a 
matter of right, because people should be entitled to speak as their 
autonomous choices dictate.145  This flaw follows naturally from each 
theorist’s open rejection of autonomy as a justification for protecting 
speech.  Meiklejohn sharply criticizes “an American Individualism whose 
excesses have weakened and riddled our understanding of the meaning of 
intellectual freedom.”146  Accordingly, his procedural due process 
approach manifestly treats nonpolitical speech like ordinary, unprivileged 
behavior and merely acknowledges the procedural limits the Constitution 
places on every government regulation.  Sunstein maintains that “an 
approach rooted in the norm of autonomy makes it difficult to understand 
what is special about speech.”147  Accordingly, although he formally 
treats nonpolitical speech like a matter of right, he too fails to offer any 
affirmative explanation why nonpolitical speech deserves constitutional 
protection.  Both Meiklejohn and Sunstein rhetorically diminish speech 
whose primary value goes to personal autonomy, treating such speech as 
a second-class constitutional citizen that can only try to squeeze under the 
edge of the protective umbrella that shields political speech.
These defects in previous attempts to locate alternative constitutional 
protection for nonpolitical speech appear inevitable, because until 
recently nothing in constitutional doctrine suggested any affirmative basis 
for meaningfully protecting nonpolitical expression without resort to a 
private rights account of the First Amendment.  In 2003, however, the 
Supreme Court provided an opening for a robust alternative source of 
constitutional protection for nonpolitical expression: substantive due 
process.  Understanding how substantive due process doctrine can 
accommodate nonpolitical speech protection requires an examination of 
how the Supreme Court’s most recent statement on substantive due 
process departs from previous law.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS SOLUTION TO THE 
NONPOLITICAL SPEECH PROBLEM
The substantive element of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ 
144 See id.
145 See supra notes 116-128 and accompanying text.
146 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 72.
147 Sunstein, supra note 21, at 304.
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Due Process Clauses148 has provided the most important constitutional 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to adjust the uneasy balance between 
majoritarian preferences, as expressed in legislative choices, and deeply 
rooted minority interests.149  Although substantive due process doctrine 
lacks a straightforward foundation in the constitutional text, its resilience 
over time testifies to our legal system’s deeply rooted insight that a 
constitutional culture of individual rights must accommodate substantive 
protections of essential human activities.  Even as the doctrine has taken 
root, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that the potentially 
sweeping character and necessarily uncertain judicial explication of 
substantive due process150 require judges to balance scrupulously the 
importance for individuals of protected conduct against significant 
government grounds for regulating that conduct.151  Thus, the twin 
challenges of substantive due process jurisprudence have been to 
articulate a theoretical basis for substantive due process rights and to 
identify the nature of government interests that can properly trump those 
rights. 
The Court’s most recent substantive due process decision, Lawrence 
v. Texas,152 takes up both of those challenges, providing important 
guidelines for the further development of substantive due process.  
Lawrence earned its landmark status by striking down all state restrictions 
on “sodomy” between consenting adults as violations of substantive due 
process.  The Court held that the Constitution precluded state efforts “to 
define the meaning of [a personal] relationship or to set its boundaries 
148 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV sec. 1 cl. 3.  Substantive due process doctrine has 
developed primarily under the Fourteenth Amendment, which by its terms applies only to 
the states.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down state’s restrictions on 
abortion under Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).  The Supreme Court has 
extended substantive due process principles to the federal government through the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.  See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) 
(noting availability of substantive due process claim under Fifth Amendment).
149 The substantive due process doctrine has generated an enormous body of 
scholarship.  For a useful recent discussion and taxonomy, see Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs 
and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 841-49 (2003) (emphasizing distinctions among strands of 
substantive due process doctrine). 
150 The great cautionary tale of substantive due process, of course, is the Court’s 
wholesale usurpation of the elected branches’ regulatory prerogatives through the economic 
substantive due process doctrine of the Lochner era.  Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905) (asserting broad judicial power to protect a laissez-faire right to contract 
against government regulation) with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (disavowing 
Lochner doctrine as improperly invasive of majoritarian prerogatives).
151 The Court initially implemented this balance, in cases of “fundamental rights,” 
through strict scrutiny.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (subjecting state 
restrictions on access to abortion to strict scrutiny).  More recently, the Court in the 
abortion context has adjusted the balance in the government’s favor by replacing strict 
scrutiny with an inquiry into whether the challenged government action places an “undue 
burden” on the abortion right.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) 
(replacing strict scrutiny with undue burden standard) (plurality opinion).  The Court to 
date has not applied the undue burden standard in any other substantive due process 
context.
152 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”153
Two pillars of the Lawrence majority’s reasoning portend sweeping 
changes beyond the scope of sodomy laws or even regulations of sexual 
behavior generally.  First, as to the basis of substantive due process 
rights, the Court articulated an expansive theory of personal autonomy as 
the essential value that substantive due process safeguards.154   Second, as 
to the nature of superseding government interests, the Court discredited 
government restrictions on protected conduct that derive from purely 
moral justifications, unrelated to potential harms to unwilling third 
parties.155
These two principles of Lawrence have great salience for a problem 
that no one has previously associated with substantive due process: the 
Constitution’s protection of nonpolitical speech.156 Lawrence affords the 
Court an opportunity to transplant constitutional speech protection 
directed at preserving personal autonomy, rather than collective political 
decisionmaking, from the First Amendment to the Due Process Clause.  
Such a shift would satisfy our deep convictions about the importance of 
preserving a constitutional safeguard for nonpolitical expression that 
advances personal autonomy.  It would also create a more coherent basis 
for assessing the social tradeoffs at stake in government regulation of 
nonpolitical speech.  At the same time, it would enable the Court, 
consistent with the public rights theory, to preserve the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause as a virtually absolute shield against 
regulations that undermine politically salient expression.
A. Lawrence v. Texas and the New Dawn of Substantive Due 
Process Protection
Prior to Lawrence, the Supreme Court’s enthusiasm for protecting 
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause appeared marginal at 
153 Id. at 567.
154 See infra notes 163-186 and accompanying text.
155 See infra notes 187-209 and accompanying text.
156 Other accounts of Lawrence have noted in passing that the Court’s sense of 
substantive due process resonates with First Amendment rhetoric.  See Wilson Huhn, The 
Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Potential in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. 
& MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 65, 78 (2003) (suggesting that Lawrence makes substantive due 
process more like First Amendment speech protection by transforming it into “a subjective, 
abstract principle”); Hunter, supra note 163, at 1107 (describing “associational freedom” as 
a predicate for “identity formation” within realm of substantive due process); Tribe, supra
note 112, at 1932 (noting similarity between Lawrence analysis and First Amendment’s 
prohibition on certain grounds for government regulation).  In addition, of course, the Due 
Process Clause has long protected a great deal of speech, through its incorporation of the 
First Amendment’s protections.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding 
that “freedom of speech and of the press –which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgment by Congress – are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the 
States”); Rubin, supra note 149, at 842 (discussing incorporation as a species of substantive 
due process doctrine).
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best.  Substantive due process doctrine had reached its recent high water 
marks in the Court’s tepid reaffirmation of the right to abortion in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey157 and indications from a splintered 
majority of Justices in Washington v. Glucksberg158 that the Due Process 
Clause might, in extreme circumstances, support a right to physician-
assisted suicide.159  But the Court had declined invitations to extend the 
substantive due process principle to new rights after Roe v. Wade,160
harshly rejecting claims for due process rights to parental visitation rights 
in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,161 to sexual autonomy in Bowers v. 
Hardwick,162 and to a right to die with dignity in Glucksberg. Lawrence
dramatically shifted the tide, reinvigorating substantive due process by 
sharpening both the doctrine’s affirmative rationale and the restrictions it 
imposes on government regulation.
1. Substantive Due Process as a Guarantor of Personal 
Autonomy
First, Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion makes the Court’s 
strongest statement to date on the roots of substantive due process 
doctrine in the personal right to live and behave autonomously.163  The 
157 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 
U.S. 747, 759 (1986) (striking down provisions of state’s abortion law because “they wholly 
subordinate constitutional privacy interests and concerns with maternal health in an effort
to deter a woman from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make”).
158 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 
261 (1990) (upholding a state court decision that required family’s discontinuation of 
daughter’s life-sustaining treatment to be supported by clear and convincing evidence of her 
wishes).
159 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (leaving open the 
question “whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a 
constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent 
death”); id. at 738 (Stevens, J. concurring in the judgments) (finding “room for further 
debate about the limits that the Constitution places on the power of the States to punish” 
physician-assisted suicide); id. at 782 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgments) (stating that 
“the importance of the individual interest here, as within that class of ‘certain interests’ 
demanding careful scrutiny of the State’s contrary claim cannot be gainsaid” but reserving 
judgment on the question “[w]hether that interest might in some circumstances, or at some 
time, be seen as ‘fundamental’ to the degree entitled to prevail”) (citation omitted).  Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg joined Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in substance.
160 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing women’s reproductive freedom as part of privacy 
rights inherent in due process).
161 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (rejecting claim of biological father to visit child in custody of 
biological mother and adoptive father).
162 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting argument that Due Process Clause conferred 
fundamental right to engage in consensual gay sex), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003).
163 The Lawrence Court’s concept of individual autonomy integrates strong concerns 
with both relative equality of treatment and interactions among different people and 
groups.  See Nan D. Hunter, Living With Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1134 (2004) 
(arguing that Lawrence reflects “an appreciation of the mutual reinforcement of equality 
and liberty principles”); Schacter, supra note 112, at 749-51 (suggesting that Lawrence 
combines notions of liberty and equality, with special emphasis on interpersonal 
relationships); David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453, 480-
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idea that substantive due process protects individuals’ right to make 
autonomous decisions about matters central to their lives and identities is 
hardly novel.  Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut,164 the Court 
rooted modern, noneconomic substantive due process in personal 
privacy,165 a concept closely related to autonomy.   Griswold linked 
substantive due process protection to the marital relationship,166 but 
Justice Brennan in Eisenstadt v. Baird167 moved toward an individualized 
notion of personal autonomy.  “If the right of privacy means anything,” 
he wrote for the Court, “it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget 
a child.”168  The seeds of personal autonomy in Eisenstadt bore doctrinal 
fruit when the Court in Roe v. Wade169 affirmed women’s due process 
right to receive abortions.  The Roe Court appeared to embrace the idea 
that the Due Process Clause protected people’s right to make intimately 
personal decisions without governmental interference.170
Eisenstadt, however, came to represent a road not taken.  Beginning 
with its emphatic approval in Bowers v. Hardwick171 of state prohibitions 
on sodomy, the Court appeared to abandon the idea that substantive due 
process embodies broad constitutional protection for personal 
autonomy.172  The key substantive due process decisions that followed 
Bowers neither recanted its restrictive reasoning nor offered much hope 
that the Court would restore a robust concept of personal autonomy to the 
center of due process jurisprudence.  In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,173
85 (casting Lawrence as a “family privacy” decision); Tribe, supra note 112, at 1898 (arguing 
that Lawrence “both presupposed and advanced an explicitly equality-based and 
relationally situated theory of substantive liberty”).
164 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
165 See id. at 485 (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone 
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”). 
166 See id. at 485-86 (basing decision to strike down state contraceptive ban on “notions 
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship”).  In emphasizing the family relationship, 
the Griswold Court followed the pattern of two cases from the 1920s, often cited as 
precursors of noneconomic substantive due process, in which the Court struck down 
restrictions on parents’ decisions about how to educate their children.  See Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
167 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
168 Id. at 453.
169 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
170 See id. at 152-53; see also Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) 
(invoking Due Process Clause to strike down state statute that banned sale of 
contraceptives to minors) (plurality opinion).
171 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
172 See id. at 191 (complaining that “despite the language of the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which appears to focus only on the processes by 
which life, liberty, or property is taken, the cases are legion in which those Clauses have 
been interpreted to have substantive content” and declaring that many of the Court’s 
noneconomic substantive due process decisions “have little or no textual support in the 
constitutional language”).
173 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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Justice Scalia’s opinion upholding a state presumption of legitimacy for 
children born in wedlock disdained any broad notion of liberty in favor of 
deference to traditions of state law.174  Although the declaration of the 
plurality in Planned Parenthood v. Casey175 that “the heart of liberty” 
harbored “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”176 anticipated 
Lawrence rhetorically, the rhetoric rang hollow as the Casey plurality 
permitted states to restrict the abortion right through enforced waiting 
periods accompanied by mandatory information designed to discourage 
abortions177 and parental consent schemes for minors who sought 
abortions.178  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in 
Washington v. Glucksberg179 comes close to disdaining substantive due 
process altogether, emphasizing the supposed analytic perils of extending 
the doctrine and reiterating the Michael H. conception of tradition-bound 
due process jurisprudence.180
Lawrence revitalizes the Eisenstadt idea of personal autonomy and 
makes it the basis of a momentous decision that boldly overrules Bowers
and enshrines in constitutional law the sexual freedom of gay men and 
lesbians.  Justice Kennedy begins his Lawrence analysis by defining 
liberty, the central value in substantive due process doctrine,181 in terms 
of autonomy: “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”182
The majority rejects the proposition that substantive due process 
protection requires a specific basis in tradition.183  In apprehending the 
issue before the Court, Justice Kennedy rebukes the view of Bowers that 
sodomy laws merely implicate “the right to engage in certain sexual 
174 See id.:
What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive parental 
rights to the natural father of a child conceived within, and born into, an 
extant marital union that wishes to embrace the child.  We are not 
aware of a single case, old or new, that has done so.  This is not the stuff 
of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are made.
Id. at 126-27.
175 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
176 Id. at 851.
177 See id. at 882 (upholding Pennsylvania’s “informed consent” requirement for 
abortions against due process challenge).
178 See id. at 899 (upholding Pennsylvania’s parental consent requirement for minors 
who seek abortions against due process challenge).
179 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
180 See id. at 720-21 (“We must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever we are 
asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the members of this Court.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).
181 See Hunter, supra note 163, at 1106-07 (suggesting that Lawrence replaces privacy 
with liberty as the principle behind substantive due process).
182 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
183 See id. at 571.  The majority leaves dissenting Justice Scalia to wave the faded flag 
of his tradition-specific approach.  See id. at 592-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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conduct.”184  That formulation of the question, Justice Kennedy insists, 
trivializes the interest of people subject to liability for violating sodomy 
prohibitions.  He posits a much broader interest at stake in substantive 
due process challenges to state restrictions on intimate behavior: “the 
autonomy of persons” in making “personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education.”185 A restriction on the sexual practices of consenting adults 
represents an effort by the state to “demean their existence [and] control 
their destiny.”186  For the Lawrence Court, substantive due process 
protects not a mere descriptive activity but rather a normative value – that 
of personal autonomy.
2. The Inadequacy of Purely Moral Justifications for Limits 
on Personal Autonomy
A second defining feature of Lawrence is the Court’s willingness to 
embrace a logical implication of noneconomic substantive due process 
doctrine that it previously avoided: government may not restrict or punish 
personal decisions based purely on moral disapproval.187  The Court’s 
rejection of the essentially moral regulations in Griswold,188 Eisenstadt,189
and Roe190 appeared to reflect an understanding that the state’s imposing 
its moral judgments on individuals’ intimate personal decisions 
effectively negates personal autonomy.  Subsequent decisions, however, 
gave substantial deference to states’ purely moral grounds for limiting 
personal autonomy.  The Bowers Court insisted that “the law . . . is 
constantly based on notions of morality”191 and practically ridiculed the 
184 Id. at 567.
185 Id. at 574.
186 Id. at 578.
187 Commentators have noted this feature of Lawrence. See Huhn, supra note 156, at
90-92; Hunter, supra note 163, at 1112; Schacter, supra note 112, at 740; but see Andrew 
Koppelman, Lawrence’s Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1175-76 (2004) (arguing that 
Lawrence Court simply found the state’s moral interest insufficient to outweigh the liberty 
interest at stake).  Professor Tribe argues that the rejection of moral regulation in Lawrence 
extends only to regulations that burden associational rights.  See Tribe, supra note 112, at 
1935-36.  The basis and scope of that asserted limit, however, remain unclear.  Another 
potential limit on the decision’s rejection of moral regulation stems from the fact that the 
sodomy statutes at issue in Lawrence carried criminal penalties.  Nothing in the opinion, 
however, limits the Court’s reasoning to criminal regulations, and Lawrence seems highly 
salient for noncriminal regulations that seriously burden personal autonomy.
188 See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 505 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“it is 
clear that the state interest in safeguarding marital fidelity can be served by a more 
discriminately tailored statute, which does not, like the present one, sweep unnecessarily 
broadly . . .”). 
 189 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972) (rejecting “deterrence of 
premarital sex” as reasonable justification for law that banned giving contraceptives to 
unmarried persons).
190 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (“[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one 
theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.”). 
 191 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
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notion of due process scrutiny for “all laws representing essentially moral 
choices.”192  The Casey plurality predicated its revision of the Roe
abortion right on heightened solicitude for the government’s interest in 
“protection of potential life.”193  In particular, the plurality compromised 
its emphasis on pregnant women’s decisional autonomy in deference to 
“the spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge that 
[abortion] procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act 
of violence against innocent human life.”194  Although the plurality 
included this interest among “consequences” of abortion,195 it made no 
effort to explain how purely moral disapproval of the procedure could 
carry anything more than a purely moral consequence.  Likewise, the 
Glucksberg Court counted among the “important and legitimate” 
government interests that justified state bans on physician-assisted 
suicide the “symbolic and aspirational as well as practical” desire to 
preserve human life.196
The Lawrence Court reverses the tendency to approve purely moral 
regulations by adopting perhaps the farthest-reaching language from 
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Bowers: “[T]he fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice.”197  Justice Kennedy underscores this rejection of 
purely moral regulation in his justification for overruling Bowers.
Contrasting this departure from stare decisis with the Court’s adherence 
to precedent in Casey,198 he explains that “there has been no individual or 
societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against 
overturning its holding once there are compelling reasons to do so.”199  As 
Justice Scalia correctly points out in dissent, many people relied 
extensively on Bowers if one treats “a governing majority’s belief that 
certain sexual behavior is ‘immoral and unacceptable’” as a cognizable 
basis for a reliance interest.200  Justice Kennedy also contrasts the 
consensual activity that sodomy prohibitions restrict with conduct that 
192 Id.
193 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992).  Of course, the question 
whether the government’s interest in protecting potential life implicates harm to a third 
party defines the philosophical frontiers of the abortion debate, but a Court committed to 
prohibiting purely moral regulation would have needed, at a minimum, to acknowledge its 
inability to resolve that question.
194 Id. at 852.
195 Id.
196 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 729 (1997) (describing state’s 
“unqualified interest in the preservation of human life”) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 
746 (recognizing government interest in the “sanctity of life”).
197 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
198 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860-61 (explaining importance of adhering to precedent in 
abortion context).
199 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
200 Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 
(1986)).
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involves “minors [or] persons who might be injured or coerced or who are 
situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused” and 
with “public conduct or prostitution.”201  Those distinctions imply that the 
state legitimately may restrict personal autonomy only where the 
autonomous decision or conduct at issue harm third parties or the 
public.202  Justice Scalia casts the majority’s distinctions into even sharper 
relief by insisting that Lawrence undermines all state prohibitions of 
“bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, 
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity” because such prohibitions 
are “sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on 
moral choices.”203
The Lawrence majority’s rejection of purely moral justifications for 
state restrictions on important decisions situates the Court in a long and 
distinguished line of critics of moral regulation.  In John Stuart Mill’s 
famous formulation, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others.”204  This “harm principle” is a familiar, and 
much debated, idea in liberal democratic theory.205  In the substantive due 
process context, the principle mandates that only the potential for harm to 
unwilling third parties can justify restraints on intimate personal 
decisions.206  Justice Kennedy in Lawrence ties the harm principle to a 
fundamental idea about the meaning of due process, equating moral 
regulation with “legal classification . . . ‘drawn for the purpose of 
201 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
202 Justice O’Connor’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Lawrence, which relies on 
the narrower ground of the Equal Protection Clause, echoes the majority’s criticism of 
purely moral regulation in the context of legal distinctions among groups of people.  For 
Justice O’Connor, “[m]oral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental 
interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn 
for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
583 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 
(1996)).
203 Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 599 (repeating charge).  Wilson 
Huhn makes the interesting observation that Justice Scalia and the Court display clashing 
visions of morality, with Justice Scalia insisting on mandatory rules where the majority 
views decisional autonomy as a predicate for morally viable personal choices.  See Huhn, 
supra note 156, at 91-93.
204 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1859).
205 The classic exchange in the past half-century about the legitimacy of purely moral 
justifications for constraints on autonomy is the Hart-Devlin debate.  Compare H.L.A. 
HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) (advocating harm principle) with PATRICK 
DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1975) (defending morality-based regulation).
206 David Meyer argues that reading Lawrence as having embraced the harm principle 
threatens to undermine the ways in which moral conceptions of family relationships have 
contributed to socially beneficial family relationships.  See Meyer, supra note 163, at 477.  
Although Meyer identifies values worth protecting, his concern rests on an unduly positive 
presumption about the effects of majoritarian morality on human flourishing; overestimates 
the ability of substantive due process doctrine to constrain affirmative government 
initiatives designed to accomplish social policy goals, such as spending programs and public 
information campaigns; and underestimates the scope of legally cognizable harm within the 
meaning of the harm principle.
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disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’”207  Although Justice 
Kennedy portrays this equation as unremarkable,208 it departs 
dramatically from the positions of Bowers, Casey, and Glucksberg.209
The Lawrence majority’s embrace of the harm principle follows naturally 
from its positive emphasis on personal autonomy.  If the Constitution 
protects people’s prerogatives to live their lives as they see fit, then 
government interference with an individual’s decisions about matters 
central to personal autonomy can only be just if necessary to protect some 
other person’s concrete interest.
B. Substantive Due Process and Nonpolitical Speech
The Court’s reasoning in Lawrence enables a fundamental revision 
of constitutional free speech doctrine.  The Lawrence account of 
substantive due process does not merely echo the private rights theory’s 
call to protect speech in the name of personal autonomy;210 rather, 
Lawrence gives that imperative a more comfortable home in substantive 
due process than it presently enjoys in the First Amendment.  The Court 
should take this opportunity to shift the basis for constitutional protection 
of speech whose primary value goes to personal autonomy from the First 
Amendment to the Due Process Clause.  Under this approach, the Court 
in nonpolitical speech cases would balance the value of the burdened 
speech for some person’s or persons’ autonomy against the concrete harm 
the speech threatened to third parties.  Complementing that change, the 
Court should limit the scope of First Amendment expressive freedom to 
speech whose primary value goes to political discourse.  
These two doctrinal moves would bring several related benefits.  
Judicial analysis of nonpolitical speech regulations would gain coherence 
and force through explicit focus on the personal autonomy value of 
speech claims and the credibility of government submissions about harm 
from expression.  Nonpolitical speech would enjoy substantial 
constitutional protection, with the strongest protection attaching to the 
speech claims that most forcefully served the societal consensus to
protect personal autonomy.  Meanwhile, political speech would gain the 
deep First Amendment protection Meiklejohn envisioned, free from the 
balancing against government regulatory interests appropriate for speech 
claims less salient to our Constitution’s central democratic aspirations.211
207 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
208 See id. at 582 (“We have never held that moral disapproval, without any other 
asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify 
a law that discriminates among groups of persons.”).
209 See supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 9-13 (discussing private rights theory’s emphasis on personal 
autonomy as basis for constitutional protection of speech).
211 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing public rights theory’s 
advocacy of categorical protection, rather than balancing, for political speech).
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The two key features of the Lawrence opinion discussed in the 
previous section – emphasis on personal autonomy as the driving force 
behind substantive due process212 and rejection of pure moral regulation 
in favor of the harm principle213 – make the Due Process Clause a viable 
source of constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech.  
First, the Lawrence Court’s emphasis on personal autonomy’s 
centrality to constitutional rights resonates strongly with the private rights 
theory of expressive freedom and thus with much contemporary free 
speech doctrine.  Under the private rights theory, the Constitution ensures 
expressive freedom because expression is an essential vehicle through 
which individuals advance their interests, and government interference 
with expression accordingly cuts to the heart of personal autonomy.  
Substantive due process, as conceptualized in Lawrence, elaborates and 
deepens that understanding, expanded to encompass all manner of self-
actualizing behavior.  Moreover, the idea of autonomy revived and 
strengthened in Lawrence reflects particular concern with personal 
freedom to conduct intimate interpersonal relationships, a concern that 
parallels the necessary emphasis of speech protection on communication 
and association between and among people.214
Prior to Lawrence, the Court’s tentative, contingent linkage of 
personal autonomy with substantive due process was too weak to provide 
a bridge between due process and free speech doctrines.215  In contrast, 
the Lawrence Court’s account of personal autonomy’s centrality to 
substantive due process echoes and sharpens the reasoning of decisions 
that protect expression because of its value for personal autonomy.  Just 
as Lawrence emphasizes “an autonomy of self that includes freedom of 
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct,”216 the Court’s 
free speech jurisprudence emphasizes the contribution speech makes to 
personal autonomy.217  Justice Kennedy’s libertarian rhetoric in Lawrence
echoes his First Amendment opinions, which strongly reflect the private 
rights theory of expressive freedom.218  He has even noted affinities 
between substantive due process and the autonomy concerns that 
undergird the private rights theory of expressive freedom, suggesting that 
early 20th Century due process decisions that protect parents’ decisions 
about child-rearing, “had they been decided in recent times, may well 
212 See supra notes 163-186 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 187-209 and accompanying text.
214 See Tribe, supra note 112, at 1939-40 (identifying “speech and the peaceful 
commingling of separate selves” as “facets of the eternal quest for . . . exchanging emotions, 
values, and ideas”).
215 See supra notes 171-180 and accompanying text.
216 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
217 See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
218 See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the 
heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or 
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”) 
(Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion).
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have been grounded upon First Amendment principles.”219
Second, the Lawrence Court’s embrace of the harm principle closely 
parallels free speech doctrine’s emphasis on the impermissibility of 
viewpoint-based regulation.  Disdain for purely moral regulation features 
prominently in First Amendment doctrine, generating free speech law’s 
core directive against viewpoint-based regulations of expression.220
Judges and scholars who disagree about other elements of First 
Amendment theory generally agree that the worst affront to expressive 
freedom is regulation that censors or punishes a particular viewpoint.221
The Supreme Court’s rejection of viewpoint-based regulation even within 
the boundaries of speech unprotected by the First Amendment indicates 
the fundamental incompatibility of constitutional speech protection with 
majoritarian judgments about the quality of competing ideas.222  Whereas 
prohibiting purely moral regulation marks a bold step for regulations of 
sexual behavior, that prohibition already pervades the law applied to 
restrictions on speech and expressive conduct.
Prior to Lawrence, the Court’s substantive due process doctrine too 
easily tolerated purely moral regulation, precluding a bridge between due 
process and free speech principles.223  Invoking substantive due process 
as a ground for protecting expression would have permitted many 
government regulations of speech based on majoritarian preferences, a 
notion intolerable to First Amendment doctrine.  But Lawrence, as in its 
focus on personal autonomy, harmonizes substantive due process with 
deep principles of expressive freedom. 224  The harm principle of 
219 Troxel v. Glanville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (discussing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1925)).
220 Prominent statements of this principle include Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-829 (1995) (“It is axiomatic that the government may not 
regulate speech based on the substantive content or the message it conveys …  Viewpoint 
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.”); Members of the City 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (“The general principle … is that 
the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some 
viewpoints or ideas at the expense or others.”); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”).
221 Compare MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 26 (positing as “the vital point” of free 
speech theory “that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one 
side of the issue rather than another”) with Fried, supra note 119, at 225 (“Government 
may not suppress or regulate speech because it does not like its content . . . .  If government 
regulates the time, place or manner of speech, it must regulate in a way that does not take 
sides between competing ideas.”).
222 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (accepting assumption that 
municipal penalty for display of objects intended to arouse anger or alarm restricted only 
unprotected “fighting words” but nonetheless striking down penalty under the First 
Amendment).  For a discussion of R.A.V. as an exemplar of rights doctrines’ focus on 
preventing improperly motivated regulations, see Tribe, supra note 112, at 1932-33; see also
Hunter, supra note 163, at 1115-16 (similarly noting Lawrence Court’s emphasis on the 
legitimacy of the government’s ground for regulation).
223 See supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text.
224 Professor Baker advances a distinctively robust autonomy-centered theory of 
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Lawrence replicates the most substantial reason for limiting speech 
protection in some instances: that the speech in question will cause 
concrete harm.225  One of the public rights theory’s core principles is that 
fear of harm has no salience in political speech cases, except in 
circumstances where the speech at issue threatens to render debate itself 
impossible.226 Lawrence allows that principle to stand under the First 
Amendment while providing a sensible guideline for balancing in
nonpolitical speech cases. 
Enlisting substantive due process to protect nonpolitical speech would 
improve upon present free speech doctrine by employing a different, 
more theoretically coherent constitutional principle to trigger searching 
judicial review of burdens on speech that primarily advances personal 
autonomy rather than political discourse.  Under present First 
Amendment doctrine, which encompasses political and nonpolitical 
speech, a court will subject a regulation to heightened scrutiny simply 
because the regulation targets or burdens an activity classified as 
expressive.  In contrast, a Lawrence-derived substantive due process 
shield for nonpolitical speech would subject a regulation of such speech 
to searching judicial review because the speech advanced personal 
autonomy.  This linkage does not imply that all expression is entitled to 
substantive due process protection, nor does it obscure the Court’s 
established commitment to protecting various kinds of nonexpressive 
conduct under the Due Process Clause.227  Rather, in light of Lawrence, 
expressive freedom, arguing that harm should not justify regulation of speech because the 
autonomy values he views as justifying speech protection supersede society’s interest in 
preventing harm.  See Baker, Harm, supra note 117, at 992.  Baker’s argument appears to 
depend on the idea that speech is a distinctive exercise of “liberty,” a notion that further 
depends on his conception of speech as operating nonviolently and noncoercively.  See id. at 
986 (defining protected expression).  Baker fails to distinguish speech from action that 
similarly advances liberty without resort to coercion and violence or, in the alternative, 
distinguish “harmful” effects of speech from coercive or violent effects.
225 The harm principle stands behind most of the present doctrines by which the 
Supreme Court excludes certain categories of speech, such as incitement and true threats, 
from First Amendment protection.  See supra note 106 (listing categories of unprotected 
speech).  The glaring exception is the obscenity doctrine.  See infra notes 274-278 and 
accompanying text (contending that acceptance of harm principle as barometer of justifiable 
speech restrictions requires rejection of Supreme Court’s present basis for permitting 
obscenity regulations).  Concerns about harm also explain Supreme Court decisions that 
uphold speech restrictions under balancing analysis.  See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (upholding state’s restriction on corporate political 
expenditures under strict scrutiny because state had compelling interest in preventing “a 
danger of real or apparent corruption”). 
226 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.  This position compels, among other 
things, full protection for political statements that insult or deride specified groups of 
people.  An aspiration of the public rights theory is that its affirmative First Amendment 
commitment to robust public debate would increase real opportunities to answer such 
hateful expression, which often targets people and groups for whom a merely formal right to 
respond with “more speech” rings hollow.  See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 9, at 
1983-85 (describing public rights theory’s substantive conception of expressive freedom).
227 See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text (describing present substantive due 
process protections for various nonexpressive activities).
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the Due Process Clause should protect behavior that advances personal 
autonomy, whether or not the behavior has the descriptive characteristics 
of “speech.”228   As a practical matter, however, expression is a category 
of behavior especially likely to serve and reflect a person’s autonomy and 
individuality.  Moreover, in classic substantive due process terms, the 
Free Speech Clause generates penumbras229 or implications230 that make 
expression the First Amendment does not protect an especially logical 
object of substantive due process protection.
Applying Lawrence to nonpolitical speech claims would avoid the 
pitfalls of previous attempts in the public rights tradition to differentiate 
constitutional protections of political and nonpolitical speech.231  Unlike 
Meiklejohn’s procedural due process salve,232 substantive due process would 
provide meaningful protection to speech that advances personal autonomy, 
reflecting the insight that nonpolitical speech, to the extent it serves the 
interest of personal autonomy, deserves a substantially greater constitutional 
shield than ordinary behavior.  Unlike Sunstein’s two-tiered First 
Amendment,233 the substantive due process approach would, thanks to 
Lawrence, enjoy a textually sound foundation and embody a principled basis 
for extending strong constitutional protection to important instances of 
nonpolitical expression.   Unlike both previous proposals, the substantive due 
process solution would advance the positive value of the public rights theory 
– maximizing protection for political speech – while also effectuating the 
insight of the private rights theory – that personal autonomy occupies a 
central place in our conception of constitutional rights – which leads society 
to favor constitutional protection of nonpolitical speech.
228 By making nonpolitical speech claims turn on the importance of the speech in 
question for personal autonomy, this due process approach would circumvent the speech-
action distinction that Robert Bork emphasized to undermine the logic of protecting 
nonpolitical speech under the First Amendment.  See Bork, supra note 29, at 25 (contending 
that First Amendment cannot protect merely self-gratifying speech because no principle 
permits distinction between self-gratifying speech and self-gratifying action).   Of course, 
shifting nonpolitical speech protection to the Due Process Clause would also require judges 
to elaborate and implement legal values, an approach that could hardly have less affinity 
with Bork’s jurisprudence.  See id. at 28 (arguing that commitment to neutral principles 
requires leaving disputes about nonpolitical speech to “the enlightenment of society and its 
elected representatives”).
229 See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (noting that “specific guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance”).
230 See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (presenting issue as whether 
law “infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
enactment violates basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’”) (quoting Palko 
v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
231 See supra notes 135-147 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text (discussing Meiklejohn’s proposal to 
protect nonpolitical speech under procedural due process principles).
233 See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text (discussing Sunstein’s proposal to 
accord nonpolitical speech a lower level of First Amendment protection than political speech 
would receive).
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Indeed, by concentrating constitutional analysis of nonpolitical speech 
claims on the personal autonomy values at stake, this substantive due process
approach would far more accurately reflect the principal reason for 
protecting nonpolitical speech than present First Amendment doctrine does.  
Under my proposal, the Constitution should not protect speech, nonpolitical
or political, merely because it is formally “speech,” but rather because it 
advances either personal autonomy or political discourse.  Focusing on the 
reason that nonpolitical speech deserves strong constitutional protection 
would give the Court a firm basis for keeping that prote ction robust.  Just as 
the public rights theory of expressive freedom requires emphasis on the 
bottom line of healthy political discourse, the Lawrence doctrine’s 
application to nonpolitical speech would require emphasis on the bottom line 
of protecting personal autonomy.
Some may object to extending substantive due process doctrine to 
encompass nonpolitical speech due to the queasiness that reflexively greets
any proposal to extend substantive due process.  Those critics assert that 
courts should avoid substantive due process because the Due Process Clause 
provides no clear standards for judicial decision and thus invites judicial 
activism.234  Even if one accepts the argument’s questionable premises – that 
any constitutional text provides more than a broad outline for a complex and 
sophisticated doctrine of rights, that personal freedom should be a stingy 
exception to the rule of government power, that judicial innovation 
contradicts the constitutional design – it does not withstand scrutiny.  First, 
the Lawrence personal autonomy principle clarifies substantive due process 
doctrine by providing a conceptually specific value capable of channeling 
judicial discretion.  Second, present First Amendment doctrine already 
requires judges to make all manner of subjective, discretionary decisions in 
balancing nonpolitical (as well as political) expressive interests against 
234 See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992):
As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the 
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.  
The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost 
care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.  
Id. at 125 (citation omitted).  Critics might also point out that the Supreme Court has 
barred substantive due process claims where a specific constitutional guarantee is available 
to challenge the conduct at issue.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (barring 
substantive due process claim against police for excessive force because plaintiff could have 
raised claim under Fourth Amendment).  Lower courts have invoked Graham to bar 
substantive due process claims because the plaintiffs could have sued under the First 
Amendment.  See Hufford v. McEnaney, 249 F. 3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2001) (firefighter’s claim 
that department fired him for reporting coworkers’ misconduct); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 
F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (prisoners’ claim of retaliation for filing lawsuits).  Peter 
Rubin has argued persuasively that only a narrow reading of Graham, limited to using 
specific rights guarantees to define the ceilings of substantive due process claims, comports 
with established rights jurisprudence.  See Rubin, supra note 149, at 865.  In any event, my 
proposal would obviate the Graham problem for nonpolitical speech claims, because those 
claims would not properly arise under the First Amendment. 
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government regulatory interests.235  Framing nonpolitical speech claims in 
personal autonomy terms, far from increasing judicial subjectivity, would 
anchor free speech jurisprudence by injecting the defining concept of 
personal autonomy into the balancing of the speaker’s and the government’s 
interests. 
The final part of this article considers how a substantive due process 
approach to protecting nonpolitical speech would work in practice.  
III. APPLYING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS TO 
NONPOLITICAL SPEECH
Shifting constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech from the 
First Amendment to the Due Process Clause would work a substantial 
change in the law.  On the First Amendment side of the fence, political 
speech would enjoy stronger protection than it now does, because no 
other categories of speech would complicate the public rights theory’s 
elevation of political speech to the highest constitutional priority.236  This 
section briefly explores the practical implications of my proposed shift 
for several controversies involving nonpolitical speech.  Courts would 
allow government to regulate speech not substantially related to personal 
autonomy based on credible showings of potential harm.  Speech integral 
to personal autonomy, however, would receive protection comparable to, 
and in some cases stronger than, the protection the First Amendment 
presently provides.
One preliminary problem is determining whose personal autonomy 
should matter in the substantive due process speech balance.  The 
subjects of the personal autonomy claim in Lawrence were direct 
participants in the legally proscribed behavior.  Courts would face greater 
challenges in determining the locus of due process claims involving 
speech.  First Amendment theorists frequently have acknowledged the 
parallel autonomy interests of speakers and people who receive 
information.237  Given the plurality of autonomy interests in expression, 
courts that applied the Due Process Clause to nonpolitical speech claims 
properly could consider the interests of receivers as well as speakers, 
according due process protection both to speech that advanced the 
speaker’s autonomy interest and to speech that advanced the autonomy 
interests of individual listeners.  Notwithstanding the vagaries of standing 
doctrine,238 the autonomy interests of receivers would provide grounds for 
235 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (discussing judicial line-drawing 
necessary under present First Amendment doctrine).
236 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (describing benefits for political 
speech of judicial shift to public rights theory).
237 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 92, at 620-21 (arguing that expressive freedom serves 
value of individual self-realization both by protecting speech and by protecting right to 
receive information).
238 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (denying standing to raise 
injuries to third parties).  An approach to constitutional speech protection that emphasized 
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institutional speakers to raise free speech claims under the Due Process 
Clause in appropriate circumstances.
The discussion that follows requires two additional caveats.  First, the 
Lawrence Court left unclear its precise standard of review and the 
relationship of its analysis to doctrinal elements of previous substantive 
due process cases.239 Considering how free speech controversies would 
play out under a Lawrence-derived regime therefore involve a necessary 
element of conjecture.  Second, my proposal would not completely divide 
all speech claims into First Amendment and substantive due process 
cases.  Claimants who challenged government interference with their 
putatively nonpolitical expression would, under my proposal, retain the 
opportunity to contend that their burdened expression had sufficient 
political character to warrant First Amendment protection.  Moreover, the 
First Amendment could support claims that restrictions on particular 
nonpolitical expression would have chilling effects on political speech.  
These sorts of contentions presumably would figure prominently in 
adjudication of free speech cases, but my discussion presumes scenarios 
in which they would not be available, in order to focus on how the Due 
Process Clause would work distinctly to protect speech.
The following discussion briefly examines my proposal’s potential 
effects on three important categories of speech that frequently lack 
political salience: artistic and cultural expression, pornography, and 
commercial advertising.
A. Artistic and Cultural Expression
The imperative to protect nonpolitical artistic and cultural expression 
against censorship has traditionally formed the most intuitive basis for 
challenging proposals to extend First Amendment protection only to 
political speech.240  Advocates of the private rights theory have made a 
powerful case for constitutional protection of artistic speech based on its 
deeply personal importance to the artist.241 Although public rights 
the consequences of protecting or regulating expression would require reevaluation of the 
Court’s present standing doctrine.  See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 9, at 1988 & 
n.211.
239 The indeterminate standard of review may simply reflect tiered scrutiny’s limited 
analytic value.  See Tribe, supra note 112, at 1916-17 (arguing that Lawrence, despite 
avoiding the ordinary rhetorical formulations of tiered scrutiny, obviously subjected the 
Texas sodomy prohibition to a rigorous standard of review).  More deeply, the Lawrence
Court may have viewed the prior substantive due process decisions’ emphasis on identifying 
“fundamental rights” as a rhetorical trap inclined to limit the doctrine’s protective scope.  
See Hunter, supra note 163, at 1119 (arguing that Court’s conservative wing “has fought to 
enshrine the category of fundamental rights as a containment device”).
240 See supra notes 118-128 and accompanying text (describing consensus in favor of 
constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech).
241 A very effective recent example is Anne S. Kurzweg, Live Art and the Audience: 
Toward a Speaker-Focused Freedom of Expression, 34 HARV. CIV. R.-CIV. L. L. REV. 437, 
439-40 (1999).
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theorists have finessed the issue by reference to art’s often indirect 
political messages, maintaining the singular constitutional status of 
political speech requires treating a significant portion of artistic 
expression as nonpolitical.242  Under present First Amendment doctrine, 
courts emphasize the value of artistic and cultural expression for personal 
autonomy and, in terms redolent of Lawrence, extend constitutional 
protection on that basis.  In the words of one recent opinion: “The 
Constitution exists precisely so that the opinions and judgments, 
including esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature, can be 
formed, tested, and expressed.  What the Constitution says is that these 
judgments are for the individual to make, not for the Government to 
decree.”243
Courts, however, have failed to develop a fully coherent justification 
for protecting artistic and cultural expression under the First 
Amendment,244 a deficit that has sometimes led to unsatisfactory 
constitutional protection for important speech.  Artistic and cultural 
expression is especially vulnerable when it explores themes of sexuality, 
thereby blurring some officials’ and courts’ perception of the boundary 
between art and pornography.245   Some decisions have blithely tolerated 
morally based regulation of art, particularly in the familiar circumstance 
where government patronage underwrites censorship.  In National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,246 the Supreme Court upheld a statutory 
requirement that federal decisions to fund art “tak[e] into consideration 
general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and 
values of the American public.”247  Although the Court tried to downplay 
the “decency and respect” requirement as merely advisory,248 it 
substantively defended the requirement as an appropriate element of the 
discretion necessarily exercised in a competitive funding process.249
Similarly, in Hopper v. City of Pasco,250 the Ninth Circuit recognized a 
prerogative of municipalities to exclude “controversial” art from public 
forums.  In sustaining a First Amendment challenge by artists whose 
work the city had refused to display, the court concluded only that the 
242 See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
243 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000); see also
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002) (“Art and literature express the 
vital interest we all have in the formative years we ourselves once knew, when wounds can 
be so grievous, disappointment so profound, and mistaken choices so tragic, but when moral 
acts and self-fulfillment are still in reach.”).
244 See Kurzweg, supra note 241, at 438 (noting absence of coherent theory and 
criticizing Supreme Court’s medium-specific approach to First Amendment protection of 
art).
245 For a discussion of pornography regulation, see infra notes 268-284 and 
accompanying text.
246 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
247 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1).
248 Finley, 524 U.S. at 581.
249 Id. at 585-86 (justifying “decency” requirement as an appropriate component of 
discretionary allocation of limited funds).
250 241 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
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city had failed to define and enforce its prohibition on “controversial” art, 
not that such a prohibition violated the Constitution.251
More prevalent than manifest judicial allowance for moral censorship 
of artistic and cultural expression has been preemptive or reactive self-
censorship by sponsoring institutions.  The Smithsonian Institution 
endured a barrage of such actions during the 1990s.  First, objections by 
western senators to the explanatory texts of an exhibit, The West as 
America, which forthrightly dealt with such issues as the ideological 
nature of the United States’ western expansion and white settlers’ 
massacres of Native Americans, led the National Museum of American 
Art to sanitize the offending texts.252  Just weeks later, the Smithsonian’s 
director temporarily removed a work by artist Sol LeWitt from a tribute 
to photographic pioneer Eadweard Muybridge because she deemed the 
work, a box with apertures through which viewers observed an 
approaching nude female, “degrading to women.”253  In 1996 the National 
Air and Space Museum cancelled a long-planned exhibit commemorating 
the Enola Gay’s atomic bombings of Japan because of controversy about 
the exhibit’s questioning the justifications for the bombings.254
Nongovernmental beneficiaries of government cultural subsidies face 
similar pressures.  In recent years, fear of controversy within the National 
Endowment for the Arts “has resulted in a kind of self-censorship among 
arts groups, officials of several organizations say, in which applicants try 
to second guess what the endowment will approve.”255
Although public patronage looms large in any discussion of artistic 
and cultural censorship, governments also use their police powers to 
suppress provocative or offensive art.  Cities shut down exhibitions due to 
complaints about offensive content.256  The FCC fines performers for 
expressing controversial or arguably immoral viewpoints over broadcast 
media.257  States prosecute artists or museums for fine-art photography 
that incorporates images of unclothed children.258 Even worse, fear of 
251 See id. at 1078.
252 See Michael Kimmelman, Old West, New Twist at the Smithsonian, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 26, 1991, at §2, p.1.
253 See Michael Kimmelman, Peering into Peepholes and Finding Politics, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 21, 1991, at §2, p.1.
254 See Paul Goldberger, Historical Shows on Trial: Who Judges?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
1996, at §2, p.1.
255 Robin Pogrebin, A New Chief Steps in at a Changed National Endowment for the 
Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2001, at A19.  
256 See, e.g., Joe Lewis, Watts Towers Show Nixed, ART IN AMERICA, Dec. 1. 2001, at 25 
(describing Los Angeles officials’ decision to shut down exhibit that included images of 
“same-sex dancing partners” and “renderings of police officers and local gang members in 
what many deemed to be homoerotic poses”).
257 See, e.g., Jones v. FCC, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16396 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 4, 2002) (denying 
on jurisdictional grounds poet’s complaint against FCC for branding one of her works 
“indecent”).
258 See, e.g., Chuck Philips, A War on Many Fronts; Censorship: 1990 Was the Year 
That “free Expression” Ran Head-on Into “Moral Concern.” But the Conflict May Only Be 
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government action, as in the context of subsidies, often leads artistic and 
cultural institutions to engage in self-censorship259  In the wake of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, numerous institutions suppressed 
expression that might have appeared offensive or provocative in light of 
the attacks.260  As in the controversies about government funding, sexual 
content has provided the most consistent source of concern.  In one recent 
example, the Denver Civic Theatre pulled down a painting displayed in 
conjunction with a performance because the painting depicted two men 
kissing.261   On a broader scale, the film, television, music, video game, 
and comic book industries, under heavy pressure from the federal 
government, have all imposed highly visible rating systems on creators.262
The common denominator in all these episodes is fear that our legal 
system cannot or will not protect challenging, autonomous artistic or 
cultural expression from majoritarian censorship.
Unless we accept the unsavory premise that public patronage carries
with it some special government prerogative to impose orthodoxy of 
viewpoint,263 considerations of “decency” and “controversy” should be 
out of bounds when government decides whether and how to sponsor 
artistic and cultural expression.264  Principles of expressive freedom even 
Beginning, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1990, at F1 (discussing federal investigation of 
photographer Jock Sturges and indictment of Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center and its 
director).
259 Investigations and harassment by government agencies certainly help explain 
private art institutions’ resort to self censorship as an alternative to adverse government 
action.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing aggressive federal 
investigation of politically charged art exhibit).
260 See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 32, at 123-24 (describing instances of 
self-censorship by privately owned artistic and cultural institutions following 2001 terrorist 
attacks).  Much of the art that raised concerns after September 11 has undeniable political 
content, which means it would receive First Amendment protection under this article’s 
approach to expressive freedom.
261 See Penny Parker, Kiss-Off of Gallery’s Artwork a Low for “Puppetry” Promoters,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 8, 2003, at 7A.
262 See, e.g., Joanne Cantor, Statement on the Need for a Universal Media Rating 
System to the United States Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, July 25, 2001, 
available at http://www.joannecantor.com/senatrat_tst.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 
2005) (describing present voluntary entertainment ratings and advocating government 
action to strengthen and standardize ratings).  Dr. Cantor prepared her statement in 
connection with a Senate committee hearing entitled “Rating Entertainment Ratings: How 
Well Are They Working for Parents, and What Can Be Done To Improve Them?”  See id.
263 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I regard the 
distinction between ‘abridging’ speech and funding it as a fundamental divide, on this side 
of which the First Amendment is inapplicable.”).  Among many reasons to reject this 
doctrine, a few can be summarized briefly: the government should never develop a habit of 
drawing moral distinctions among citizens’ competing ideas; government funding has 
sufficient importance to make it a practical necessity for many artists; and discretionary 
government rejection of a particular moral perspective strongly implies government 
disapproval of that perspective, raising the danger of a chilling effect on other speech.  The 
public rights theory may also compel a strong rule of government nondiscrimination in 
subsidizing expression as a protective condition on the theory’s heightened tolerance for 
government regulation to expand expressive freedom.  See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 297-
99 (advocating such a rule).
264 A conceivable objection to my contention that the Due Process Clause would 
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more obviously should preclude government censorship of private artistic 
and cultural speech.  In both contexts, the Constitution should provide 
assurances sufficient to deter preemptive self-censorship.  The holes in 
present First Amendment doctrine’s protection of nonpolitical artistic and 
cultural expression derive from courts’ failures to recognize the 
constitutional significance of personal autonomy and to reject morally 
based assaults on autonomous expression.  The autonomy and harm
principles articulated in Lawrence make substantive due process a more 
cogent and effective source of constitutional protection for nonpolitical 
artistic expression than the First Amendment has been.  Under the 
reasoning of Lawrence, art’s importance for furthering personal 
autonomy would elevate censorship of art to the height of substantive due 
process concern.265  Likewise, the Lawrence Court’s firm rejection of 
moral grounds for restricting personal autonomy should place nearly all 
artistic and cultural censorship out of bounds.266  Justifying a restriction 
on artistic or cultural expression would require a persuasive showing that 
the expression caused concrete harm.267 Ideological biases and “decency” 
canards would not suffice.  
B. Pornography
The Supreme Court purports to accord full First Amendment 
protection to nonobscene, sexually explicit speech.268  The Court, 
however, has shown unusual willingness to credit the government’s 
grounds for regulating pornography.  For example, in Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc.,269 which upheld certain state restrictions on nude dancing, 
the Court only grudgingly admitted that such performance was expressive 
toughen the Court’s protection of art in the particular context of government sponsorship is 
that the Court, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Serv’s Dept., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), 
held that the Due Process Clause does not place affirmative obligations on the government.  
That objection lacks force.  When the government establishes a public grant program, and 
then chooses one applicant over another on moral grounds, it is exercising its discretion 
within a course of action to which it has already committed.  That commitment 
distinguishes the arts funding scenario from the DeShaney majority’s account of the case 
before it, where the state agency had taken no actions that would have led it to remove a 
reportedly abused child from his father’s custody.  See id. at 192-93 (describing state’s 
actions in case).   Moreover, the Court decided DeShaney during a period when it generally 
disdained substantive due process doctrine, and Lawrence represents a clear break from 
that period.
265 See supra notes 163-186 and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence decision’s 
commitment to personal autonomy as the basis for substantive due process doctrine).
266 See supra notes 187-209 and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence decision’s 
rejection of purely moral grounds for government regulation of activity with value for 
personal autonomy).
267 One submission that might satisfy this standard would be a demonstrated public 
health risk from an artistic performance that exposed an audience to contaminated blood.  
See Kurzweg, supra note 241, at 483.
268 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-75 (1997) (reiterating doctrine that, for 
adults, nonobscene sexually explicit speech receives constitutional protection).
269 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
49
conduct at all270 and then subordinated the respondents’ expressive 
interests to an amorphous “substantial government interest in protecting 
order and morality.”271  Similarly, the Court has upheld municipal zoning 
ordinances that restrict the locations of adult entertainment businesses by 
minimizing the expressive interests at issue while validating government 
prerogatives to combat posited but undocumented “secondary effects” of 
such businesses.272  The Court has even placed a subset of pornography, 
labeled “obscenity,” entirely outside the First Amendment’s protection.273
These departures from First Amendment doctrine resist principled 
explanation and threaten to undermine the precepts of expressive 
freedom.
Moving nonpolitical speech protection from the First Amendment to 
the Due Process Clause would sharpen constitutional analysis of 
pornography regulation.  First, pornographic material’s entitlement to 
constitutional protection, rather than turning on the material’s technically 
expressive character, would depend largely on the material’s contribution 
to the personal autonomy of its creators and/or consumers.  Pornography 
producers could not simply run to court, crying about lost profits.  On the 
other hand, courts could not reflexively dismiss pornographic material’s 
claims to constitutional protection based on abstractions about whether 
the material was “speech”; instead, they would need to examine the 
material’s value for advancing personal autonomy.  Second, courts would 
need to distinguish precisely between moral and harm-based justifications 
for restrictions on pornography, allowing only the latter to vindicate 
challenged regulations.  Regulators would have the opportunity to prove 
that pornographic material caused concrete social harms.  They could not, 
however, justify state pornography regulations simply by asserting the 
existence of unspecified harms, let alone by claiming an interest in 
upholding some notion of public morality.
A shift from First Amendment to substantive due process protection 
for pornography probably would produce mixed decisional results.  On 
one hand, constitutional protection for sexually explicit speech would 
increase dramatically because, in light of Lawrence, the Supreme Court’s 
obscenity doctrine is untenable.  The Court’s decision in Miller v. 
California274 permits criminal penalties for “obscene” speech, defined to 
encompass
works which depict or describe sexual conduct.  That 
270 See id. at 566 (holding that exotic dancing “is expressive conduct within the outer 
perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so”).
271 Id. at 569.
272 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding Renton, 
Wash. ordinance that mandated distances between adult movie theatres and residential 
neighborhoods, churches, parks, and schools); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 
U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding Detroit ordinances that prohibited concentrations of adult-
oriented businesses).
273 See infra notes 274-278 and accompanying text.
274 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable 
state law, as written or authoritatively construed.  A state 
offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a 
whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray 
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, 
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.275
First Amendment doctrine never should have tolerated such a blatant 
capitulation to majoritarian biases, but it has.  In contrast, the Miller
Court’s categorical exemption from expressive freedom runs afoul of 
both aspects of Lawrence that would animate substantive due process 
protection for nonpolitical speech.  First, the Miller test takes no account 
of the autonomy value of obscene material.  The Miller safe harbor for 
“serious artistic value” provides some basis for considering autonomy 
arguments, but it speaks in cramped, impersonal terms, leaving the 
autonomy interests of creators and receivers of “obscene” material 
invisible.  Lawrence compels correction of that defect in Miller, not least 
because Lawrence itself found autonomy value in what some consider 
“deviant” sexual behavior276 – exactly the sort of behavior whose mere 
portrayal Miller allows states to criminalize.  Second, Miller carved out 
an exception to First Amendment protection based entirely on states’ 
putative interests in moral regulation, defining the “prurient interest” 
prong of the obscenity test by reference to the perspective of “the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards.”277   The Court 
made no effort to ground the exception in concrete harm to third parties.  
Under substantive due process as elaborated in Lawrence, the species of 
purely moral regulation enabled by Miller cannot survive.278
275 Id. at 24 (footnote omitted).
276 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (explaining that “statutes that 
purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act . . . touch[] upon the most 
private human conduct, sexual behavior”).
277 Miller, 423 U.S. at 24.  This factor distinguishes the Court’s treatment of “obscenity” 
from its analysis of other categories of speech as to which it has denied or limited First 
Amendment protection, all of which threaten some degree of harm to third parties.  See 
supra note 106 (identifying categories of unprotected and partially protected speech under 
present First Amendment doctrine).
278 One federal judge recently held an obscenity prosecution unconstitutional on the 
theory that Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), established a fundamental right to 
possess obscene material, which Lawrence must shield from morally based regulation.  See
United States v. Extreme Associates, Inc., 2005 WL 121749 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2005).  
Another district judge has rejected that argument.  See United States v. Gartman, 2005 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 1501 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005) (denying motion for reconsideration).  Present 
First Amendment doctrine cannot coherently support the reasoning of Extreme Associates,
because that doctrine has long and consistently accommodated the morally grounded Miller
test despite Stanley and despite the otherwise prominent prohibition on viewpoint-based 
discrimination.  Sharpening free speech jurisprudence by applying substantive due process 
categorically to nonpolitical speech, as this article proposes, would repair this longstanding 
anomaly more effectively than either trying to patch flawed First Amendment doctrine 
piecemeal with bits of Lawrence or imagining that Lawrence completely subsumed the First 
Amendment within the Due Process Clause.
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On the other hand, a substantive due process analysis would decrease 
constitutional protection for pornography that had limited value for the 
autonomy of artists or consumers, to the extent regulators could show that 
the material likely would harm third parties.  These were precisely the 
contentions advanced on behalf of the MacKinnon-Dworkin 
antipornography ordinance struck down in American Booksellers 
Association v. Hudnut.279  Because institutional profits do not advance 
personal autonomy in the sense of Lawrence, the only viable autonomy 
claims for pornography would lie with creators – a group that could 
include writers, photographers, and directors as well as models and 
performers – and consumers.  In many cases, creators might face 
difficulty trying to parlay the creative content of commercial pornography 
into viable autonomy claims; moreover, the pornography industry’s 
exploitation of models and performers would likely yield, from their 
standpoint, negative autonomy values in many cases.280  Pornography 
consumers potentially could raise salient claims that various pornographic 
materials made significant contributions to their sexual autonomy.  On 
the other hand, defenders of the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance in 
Hudnut maintained that pornography, far from advancing its consumers’ 
autonomy, undermined some consumers’ will, increasing their 
propensities toward misogyny and sexual violence.281  Thus, the posited 
behavioral consequences of pornography provided the most powerful 
justification for the ordinance, which its defenders characterized as 
protecting women from rape and other forms of gendered violence and 
exploitation that shatter their autonomy.
In his Hudnut opinion, Judge Easterbrook offered no suggestion that 
any person’s autonomy was relevant to evaluating the ordinance, instead 
stressing the importance of preventing government from interfering with 
the descriptive category of “speech.”282  Likewise, Judge Easterbrook 
turned the harm arguments advanced by the ordinance’s defenders against 
them, concluding that any rape or harassment that resulted from 
pornography demonstrated pornography’s rhetorical effectiveness.283
These elements of Easterbrook’s decision, while controversial even on 
conventional First Amendment terms, reflect the reality that the ordinance 
faced a strong First Amendment challenge simply because it restricted 
speech.  A substantive due process analysis would proceed from more 
precise premises: the centrality of autonomy for nonpolitical speech 
protection and the requirement of harm to justify regulation.  Had the 
279 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
280 See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE 
AND LAW 127-33 (1987) (arguing that pornography industry materially exploits and 
demeans women who work in it).
281 See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 (accepting government’s premise that “[d]epictions of 
subordination tend to perpetuate subordination”). 
282 See id. at 327-28.
283 See id. at 329 (asserting that any harm caused by pornography “simply proves the 
power of pornography as speech”).
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ordinance’s defenders succeeded in undermining autonomy arguments on 
behalf of pornography and in linking pornography to concrete harms, they 
might well have defeated a due process challenge.284
C. Corporate and Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court over the past three decades has developed an 
increasingly expansive doctrine of First Amendment protection for 
corporate speech.  The Court generally treats corporations like individuals 
in First Amendment analysis, extending full protection to most types of 
corporate speech.285  The Court has distinguished from fully protected 
expression the category of “commercial speech,” a term of art that 
generally encompasses commercial advertising,286 but even that subset of 
corporate speech gets substantial First Amendment protection under a 
species of intermediate heightened scrutiny.287  Although the Court’s 
protection for “commercial speech” deviates from its prior deference to 
government regulation of advertising,288 several justices have advocated 
further diminishing the distinction between commercial speech and fully 
protected speech.289  In contrast to my proposal’s beneficial implications 
284 I offer no view about the likelihood of making either showing, and my hesitation 
about predicting the result in the due process scenario reflects a doctrinal problem that 
adopting my proposal would require the Court to resolve.  Whatever its other constitutional 
defects, the version of the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance struck down in Hudnut was 
drafted in a manner that, as the district court had concluded, almost certainly rendered it 
overbroad.  See American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1339-40 (S.D. 
Ind. 1984).  The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine represents a singular exception to 
standing doctrine developed in the context of the present, inclusive First Amendment to 
protect against government action that chills expression.  See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (describing First Amendment overbreadth doctrine as an exception to 
ordinary standing rules).  The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine should apply in 
substantive due process cases where challenged burdens on nonpolitical speech threatened 
to cross into the First Amendment’s domain by chilling political expression.
285 See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down state 
restriction on corporate expenditures to influence referendum proposals); see also Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (distinguishing lesser First 
Amendment protection accorded commercial advertising from full protection accorded 
corporation’s “direct comments on public issues”).
286 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 772 (1976) (defining special First Amendment category of “commercial speech” as 
connoting “speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).
287 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980):
If [commercial speech] is neither misleading nor related to unlawful 
activity . . . the State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved 
by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory 
technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation on 
expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal.
Id. at 564.
288 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that constitutional 
speech protection did not extend to commercial advertising).
289 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (advocating more 
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for artistic and cultural expression290 and ambiguous implications for 
pornography,291 shifting protection for nonpolitical speech from the First 
Amendment to the Due Process Clause would substantially diminish 
constitutional protection for commercial speech and for corporate speech 
generally.
The Supreme Court generally grants substantive due process 
protection only to natural persons.  That limitation marks one of the 
strongest distinctions between the contemporary substantive due process 
doctrine that emerged from Griswold v. Connecticut292 and the discredited 
doctrine of Lochner v. New York.293 The Lawrence Court’s crystallization 
of personal autonomy as the basis for substantive due process protection 
strengthens the logic of limiting due process protection to individuals, 
because only individuals can experience personal autonomy.   The 
limitation of substantive due process protection to natural persons also 
distinguishes due process doctrine from the Supreme Court’s protection 
of commercial speech under the First Amendment, which reflects the 
Court’s general tendency to extend constitutional rights guarantees to 
corporate “persons” without regard to any underlying interest of discrete 
individuals.294  Thus, one important consequence of shifting protection for 
nonpolitical speech from the First Amendment to the Due Process Clause 
would be that only natural persons’ interests could form the basis for 
nonpolitical free speech claims.  Those interests might be manifest in 
certain institutions, such as theater companies or publications’ editorial 
boards, but a claim could prevail only if suppression of the speech at 
issue undermined some natural person’s or persons’ personal 
autonomy.295  This limitation would render corporate free speech claims 
presumptively untenable.
The logic of allowing only natural persons to raise nonpolitical 
speech claims under the Due Process Clause, and the resulting dearth of 
constitutional protection for corporate speech, underscores the Lawrence
doctrine’s affinity with previous autonomy-based theories of expressive 
freedom.  Professor Baker, perhaps the most sophisticated proponent of 
searching First Amendment review of commercial speech regulations that serve “end[s] 
unrelated to consumer protection”) (plurality opinion); id. at 523 (Thomas, J. concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (rejecting Central Hudson balancing test for 
commercial speech “at least when, as here, the asserted interest is one that is to be achieved 
through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark”) (footnote omitted).
290 See supra notes 240-267 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 268-284 and accompanying text.
292 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state ban on dispensing contraceptives as a 
violation of fundamental constitutional right to privacy).
293 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down state regulation of employees’ hours as a violation 
of substantive due process right to contract).
294 See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (extending 
equal protection doctrine to corporations).
295 For a related contention that only natural persons’ autonomy interests should 
ground constitutional rights claims and insulate behavior from constitutional responsibility 
through the public-private distinction, see Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 32, at 
146-50.
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an autonomy-based approach to the First Amendment, has argued that an 
autonomy focus should preclude protection for corporate speech.296
Baker conceptualizes expressive freedom as a shield for “individual 
freedom and choice,” and he rejects constitutional protection for 
commercial speech, broadly defined to encompass corporate speech 
generally, because “commercial speech does not represent an attempt to 
create or affect the world in a way which can be expected to represent 
anyone’s private or personal wishes.”297  The present doctrine of forceful 
First Amendment protection for commercial speech has developed in 
spite of the Supreme Court’s substantial embrace of the autonomy-based 
private rights theory.298  Eliminating that anomaly would exemplify the 
increased clarity a substantive due process approach would bring to 
nonpolitical speech controversies.
In contrast to Baker’s single-minded emphasis on the speaker’s 
autonomy,299 the conception of personal autonomy this article has derived 
from Lawrence also encompasses the autonomy interests of people who 
receive information.300  Under conventional First Amendment analysis, 
the Supreme Court has maintained that consumers gain valuable insights, 
and thus increase their ability to make autonomous decisions in the 
economic marketplace, through exposure to commercial information.301
Stripping away the rhetorical bunting of the First Amendment, however, 
would facilitate a fresh critique of receiver-focused arguments for 
protecting corporate and commercial speech.  First, the due process 
setting would provide space that the First Amendment precludes for 
considering countervailing ways in which commercial speech diminishes
personal autonomy by manipulating its audience.  Just as pornography 
arguably can erode some of its consumers’ inhibitions against rape and 
sexual assault,302 commercial advertising arguably can erode its receivers’ 
resistance to unfulfilling or even harmful consumption.303  Second, even 
296 See C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976) (hereinafter Baker, Commercial Speech).
297 Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).  Baker extends his limitation on First Amendment 
protection to exclude corporate speech generally, including corporate political speech, 
because profit incentives rather than individual value choices motivate corporate speech.  
See id. at 14-18.
298 See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
299 See Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 296, at 8 (arguing that First Amendment 
“does not give the listener any right other than to have the government not interfere with a 
willing speaker’s liberty”).
300 See supra notes 237-238 and accompanying text.
301 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (positing “that [commercial] information is not in itself 
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough 
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication 
rather than to close them”).
302 See supra notes 279-284 and accompanying text.
303 “The economic enterprise does not passively accept individual values as given.  In 
order to increase profits, the enterprise attempts to create and manipulate values.  It does 
this by stimulating particular desires.”  Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 296, at 19. 
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to the extent commercial speech increases consumers’ autonomy, that 
effect falls short of the autonomy benefits enjoyed by receivers of art and 
even some pornography.  Those forms of nonpolitical expression 
frequently connect with their audiences at deep levels of personal 
intimacy.  In contrast, the principal argument for protecting commercial 
speech – that it assists consumers in making economic decisions – speaks 
to the less integral idea of economic autonomy.  Corporations’ 
advertisements surely facilitate consumer purchasing choices, but so do 
their manufacturing decisions, financial strategies, and distribution 
practices, all of which the Court’s disavowal of Lochner long ago made 
clear the government may regulate without regard to due process 
concerns.
In addition, the Due Process Clause likely would protect commercial 
speech less forcefully than the First Amendment does because rationales 
offered for regulating commercial speech, as opposed to those offered for 
regulating art and pornography, tend to appeal much more to practicality 
than to morality.304  States tend to regulate commercial advertising 
because of concerns about consumer protection305 or public health.306
Present First Amendment doctrine gives courts a basis for dismissing 
even those interests as insufficient to justify regulations.307  In contrast, 
the Due Process Clause after Lawrence compels a pivotal distinction 
between merely moral reasons for regulating conduct and reasons that 
rely on a danger of concrete injury to third parties.308  Particular 
commercial speech regulations might fail due process review because 
The Supreme Court has shown inconsistency in evaluating consumer manipulation 
arguments against protection of commercial advertising.  Compare Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Assoc’s v. Tourism Company, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding regulation of gambling 
advertising based on interest in not encouraging gambling) with 44 Liquormart v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down regulation of liquor advertising despite state’s 
interest in not encouraging alcohol abuse).
304 See supra notes 246-251, 274-278 and accompanying text (discussing moral bases of 
efforts to regulate art and pornography).
305 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977) (noting that state defended 
attorney advertising ban on ground that advertising would lead attorneys to provide clients 
with services not tailored to clients’ particular needs).
306 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 767 (noting that state 
defended drug price advertising ban on ground that such advertising “will place in jeopardy 
the pharmacist’s expertise and, with it, the customer’s health”).  Some commercial speech 
regulations arguably serve purely moral purposes.  See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc’s 
v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (upholding restriction on casino gambling 
advertising as advancing substantial government interest in “reduction of demand for 
casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico”).  Assuming a state could not show that 
such a regulation prevented some cognizable injury within the meaning of the Lawrence
harm principle, and assuming the regulated advertisement advanced personal autonomy in 
some meaningful sense, a substantive due process approach to protecting noncommercial 
speech would foreclose the regulation.
307 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 378-79 (rejecting consumer protection rationale on grounds of 
ineffectiveness); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (rejecting public health 
justification on grounds of paternalism).
308 See supra notes 204-209 and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence Court’s 
embrace of harm principle).
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they rested on insufficiently forceful showings of potential for injury, but 
courts could not presumptively dismiss the justifications usually offered 
for regulating commercial speech.
CONCLUSION
Present First Amendment doctrine does not protect speech well 
enough.  By treating political expression like any other kind of speech 
and balancing it against government regulatory interests, federal courts 
have allowed entrenched power and majoritarian pressure to stifle 
political debate and dissent.  Conversely, by following the intuition that 
personal autonomy justifies expressive freedom but never explicating 
what personal autonomy means and what government interests can 
properly trump it, courts have created an often incoherent system of 
expressive freedom that underprotects artistic and cultural expression, 
overprotects corporate and commercial speech, and manages at turns to 
overprotect and underprotect pornography.  Theorists who view 
expressive freedom as a positive public right rooted in the need for
informed democratic discourse have long advocated a sensible solution to 
the political speech side of the problem: narrow the First Amendment’s 
protection to political speech but deepen the force of that protection to 
make suppression of political expression virtually impossible.
The Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence 
complements that solution by providing a way to protect nonpolitical 
speech outside the First Amendment.  The Court has grounded 
substantive due Process protection in a rich and thorough account of
personal autonomy.  The Court also has declared that personal autonomy 
interests must yield to countervailing governmental regulatory interests 
only where the government regulates to prevent some tangible harm, as 
distinct from a purely moral affront to the majority’s sensibilities.  These 
two principles of substantive due process, which resonate deeply with the 
rhetoric of prevailing, autonomy-based First Amendment doctrine, allow 
for a revision of constitutional expressive freedom that would reflect the 
distinct reasons why the Constitution protects political and nonpolitical 
speech.  Nonpolitical expression, which contributes powerfully but not 
uniquely to the personal autonomy of both speakers and listeners, should 
take its place in the pantheon of substantive due process rights, where the 
Court’s prohibition against purely moral regulation provides strong 
assurance against government censorship of unpopular ideas.
This article’s proposal for amending free speech doctrine may raise 
concerns in two camps.  First, some civil libertarians may view it as a 
Trojan horse, designed to impose on the First Amendment a substantive 
preference for political speech while maneuvering nonpolitical speech 
into a weakened position.  In fact, my proposal refines the public rights 
theory of expressive freedom by taking personal autonomy seriously and 
developing a basis for powerful nonpolitical speech protection that 
actually improves on the coherence of present First Amendment doctrine.  
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Second, judicial minimalists may fear assigning courts the conceptually 
difficult and important tasks of distinguishing political from nonpolitical 
speech and, in nonpolitical speech cases, striking a proper balance 
between personal autonomy values and government interests in 
preventing harms.  The proposal, however, asks judges to draw no more 
difficult lines and strike no more challenging balances than any doctrine 
of expressive freedom inevitably must and present First Amendment 
doctrine already does.  The proposal improves on present doctrine by
compelling judges in free speech cases to articulate and apply the specific 
values that anchor our constitutional commitment to protecting both 
political and nonpolitical speech.
